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ARTICLES
Acting Differently:
How Science on the Social Brain Can
Inform Antidiscrimination Law
SUSAN D. CARLE*
Legal scholars are becoming increasingly interested in
how the literature on implicit bias helps explain illegal discrimination. However, these scholars have not yet mined all
of the insights that science on the social brain can offer antidiscrimination law. That science, which researchers refer
to as social neuroscience, involves a broadly interdisciplinary approach anchored in experimental natural science
methodologies. Social neuroscience shows that the brain
tends to evaluate others by distinguishing between “us” versus “them” on the basis of often insignificant characteristics, such as how people dress, sing, joke, or otherwise behave. Subtle behavioral markers signal social identity and
group membership, which in turn trigger the brain’s tendency toward us versus them thinking. This research speaks
to the considerations underlying antidiscrimination law, and
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suggests that social neuroscientists and antidiscrimination
theorists should be in conversation.
Indeed, my investigation shows that social neuroscience
and legal antidiscrimination theory are reaching a “consilience”—meaning an unlikely agreement in approaches between disparate academic subjects. Both agree on the importance of promoting tolerance for human behavioral difference. The time is ripe to explore this consilience more
deeply. I do so preliminarily in this Article, proposing that
antidiscrimination law should pay more attention to (1) the
ways in which discrimination occurs through decision-makers’ distaste for those who “act differently” (rather than
identity status alone), and (2) the need for more theory supporting a general human right to “act differently” within
reasonable bounds.
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INTRODUCTION
In one of many extraordinary moments in the last U.S. presidential campaign, then-candidate Donald Trump mocked the arm movements of a reporter with a condition that causes bent wrists.1 Holding his hands in a twisted position, Trump proclaimed, “You gotta
see this guy,” and flailed his arms to “imitate” the reporter’s disability.2 This was far from the only time Trump ridiculed or condemned
1

See Alan Gathright & Louis Jacobson, Donald Trump Says Hillary Clinton
Is ‘Wrong’ to Say He Mocked a Disabled Reporter, POLITIFACT (Oct. 20, 2016,
1:31 AM), http://www.politifact.com/truth-o-meter/statements/2016/oct/20/donald-trump/donald-trump-says-hillary-clinton-wrong-say-he-moc/.
2
Id. (describing Trump’s denial as false and providing a video of Trump’s
words and actions). The reporter “speaks with a normal voice and doesn’t flail his
arms around.” Id.
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others for allegedly acting differently. Trump falsely characterized
social groups as acting differently in many ways. His campaign rhetoric included repeated claims that Mexicans commit crime, engage
in drug dealing, and commit rapes and murders.3 Trump characterized Syrian refugees as supporting ISIS,4 Muslims as supporting terrorism,5 and African Americans as well as Latinos as committing
the “overwhelming amount of violent crime in our major cities.”6 In
all of these and many more instances, Trump linked a social category with allegedly aberrant ways of acting; in other words, he reviled people for acting differently.
Social scientists correlate Trump’s rhetoric with a rise in the social acceptability of expressing prejudiced opinions. 7 Hate-watch
groups document a significant uptick in the incidence of hate crimes
throughout the United States. 8 Even more disturbingly, Trump’s
3

See, e.g., Katie Reilly, Here Are All the Times Donald Trump Insulted Mexico, TIME (Aug. 31, 2016), http://time.com/4473972/donald-trump-mexico-meeting-insult/ (quoting Trump saying, inter alia, “They’re bringing drugs. They’re
bringing crime. They’re rapists”); Theodore Schleifer, Trump: Mexican ‘Rapists’
Coming Now, Middle East ‘Terrorists’ Coming Soon, CNN: POLITICS (June 25,
2015, 8:47 PM), https://www.cnn.com/2015/06/25/politics/donald-trump-mexicans-terrorists-immigration-2016/ (quoting Trump saying, inter alia, “Some are
good and some are rapists and some are killers”).
4
Brinley Bruton, Katy Tur & Molly Roecker, Trump Tells Rally Syria Refugees ‘Probably’ ISIS as Muslim Protester Removed, NBC NEWS (Jan. 9, 2016,
11:00 AM), https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/2016-election/trump-tells-rallysyria-refugees-probably-isis-muslim-protester-removed-n493316.
5
Jenna Johnson & Abigail Hauslohner, ‘I Think Islam Hates Us’: A Timeline
of Trump’s Comments About Islam and Muslims, WASH. POST (May 20, 2017),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-politics/wp/2017/05/20/i-think-islam-hates-us-a-timeline-of-trumps-comments-about-islam-and-muslims/?utm_
term=.87c3e4bdeab9.
6
Roque Planas, Donald Trump Blames Crime on Blacks, Hispanics, HUFF
POST (June 5, 2013, 8:04 PM), https://www.huffpost.com/entry/donald-trumpblames-crime_n_3392535 (quoting Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump),
TWITTER (June 5, 2013, 4:05 AM), https://twitter.com/realdonaldtrump/status/342190428675796992?lang=en).
7
Chris S. Crandall & Mark H. White, II, Trump and the Social Psychology
of Prejudice, UNDARK (Nov. 17, 2016), https://undark.org/article/trump-socialpsychology-prejudice-unleashed/.
8
See, e.g., CTR. FOR THE STUDY OF HATE & EXTREMISM, CAL. STATE UNIV.,
SAN BERNARDINO, FINAL U.S. STATUS REPORT: HATE CRIME ANALYSIS & FORECAST FOR 2016/2017 (2017), https://csbs.csusb.edu/sites/csusb_csbs/files/Final%
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rhetoric against those who allegedly act differently may have helped
rather than hurt him in the polls in 2016.9 Something about mocking
others based on behavioral stereotypes appealed to many voters.10
It comes as no surprise that people may be reviled based on perceived conduct differences. Examples from classic racist, anti-Semitic, and homophobic rhetoric vividly illustrate this. Reconstruction Era racist Ben Davis described the “Jim Crow Negro” as “an
abnormal product” who lives “in the realm of the superficial,” lacks
good character and respectability, and is an “idle, educated misfit.”11
Nazi Reich Minister of Propaganda Joseph Goebbels condemned
Jews as “instigators, rabble-rousers and slave drivers,” who are
“bloodthirsty and vengeful agitators and political lunatics,” exhibit
“rage and deep hatred,” “follow a different moral code,” and engage
in “countless crimes.”12 In 1978, best-selling author Tim LaHaye
described gay people’s behavior as angry, obsessively selfish, and
exhibiting a “sinful life style that contagiously reaches into the
minds of otherwise normal young people,”13 while California Senator John Briggs argued for firing all gay teachers because “most of
them are seducing young boys in toilets.”14 I need not further bela-

20Hate%20Crime%2017%20Status%20Report%20pdf.pdf.
9
See Sean McElwee & Jason McDaniel, Economic Anxiety Didn’t Make
People Vote Trump, Racism Did, NATION (May 8, 2017), https://www.thenation.com/article/economic-anxiety-didnt-make-people-vote-trump-racism-did/
(discussing the authors’s analysis of the “American National Election Studies preand post-election survey” and concluding, “Trump accelerated a realignment in
the electorate around racism, across several different measures of racial animus–
and that it helped him win”).
10
Cf. id. (“Both racial resentment and black influence animosity are significant predictors of Trump support among white respondents . . . .”).
11
Ben Davis, The Jim Crow Negro: Editor Ben Davis’ Observations, RICHMOND PLANET, Dec. 13, 1919, at 3, https://chroniclingamerica.loc.gov/lccn/
sn84025841/1919-12-13/ed-1/seq-4.pdf.
12
Joseph Goebbels, The War and the Jews, CALVIN C.: GERMAN PROPAGANDA ARCHIVE, http://research.calvin.edu/german-propaganda-archive/goeb
37.htm (last vistited Mar. 23, 2019) (originally published in JOSEPH GOEBBELS,
DER STEILE AUFSTIEG 263–70 (1944)).
13
TIM F. LAHAYE, THE UNHAPPY GAYS: WHAT EVERYONE SHOULD KNOW
ABOUT HOMOSEXUALITY 46−47, 51, 153 (1978).
14
History of the Anti-Gay Movement Since 1977, SOUTHERN POVERTY L.
CTR.: INTELLIGENCE REP. (Apr. 28, 2005), https://www.splcenter.org/fighting-
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bor this disturbing point: “othering”—or rendering subhuman a reviled out-group—often involves characterizing that group’s behavior as abhorrently different.15
Perceived difference in the way people act can trigger ill treatment in several ways. One involves actual differences in human beings’ biological makeup, as in the example involving the reporter
Trump mocked for having a physiological difference.16 Disability
advocates have begun to use the term neurodiversity to capture these
biologically based human variations.17 I have previously written on
discrimination based on neurologically based differences in how
people behave socially,18 so here I will not focus on that topic—i.e.,
on discrimination on the basis of acting differently that generally
falls within the ambit of disability rights law. My prior analysis in
that article, however, provides an important building block for the
arguments I present here. It matters not whether behavioral difference arises from an “impairment” or any other source: such difference often constitutes a basis for invidious discrimination.19
The examples of racist, anti-Semitic, and homophobic rhetoric I
just offered involve another kind of acting differently. In those examples, hatemongers use allegations that social out-groups act differently as a reason to revile them.20 Just as perceptions that someone acts differently can produce discrimination in the disability law
hate/intelligence-report/2005/history-anti-gay-movement-1977; see also Evelyn
Schlatter, 18 Anti-Gay Groups and Their Propaganda, SOUTHERN POVERTY L.
CTR.: INTELLIGENCE REP. (Nov. 4, 2010), https://www.splcenter.org/fightinghate/intelligence-report/2010/18-anti-gay-groups-and-their-propaganda; The Religious Right and Anti-Gay Speech: Messengers of Love or Purveyors of Hate?,
WIRED STRATEGIES: MATTHEW SHEPARD ONLINE RESOURCES, http://www.wired
strategies.com/sheldon.html (providing a long list of quotes from gay bashers attributing abhorrent conduct to gay people).
15
See infra note 148 and accompanying text.
16
See Gathright & Jacobson, supra note 1.
17
See, e.g., THOMAS ARMSTRONG, THE POWER OF NEURODIVERSITY 8 (2011)
(defining the concept of neurodiversity and explaining its relationship to disability
rights advocacy).
18
See Susan D. Carle, Analyzing Social Impairments Under Title I of the
Americans with Disabilities Act, 50 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1109 (2017) [hereinafter
Carle, Social Impairments].
19
See id. at 1170–80.
20
See, e.g., Goebbels, supra note 12.
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context, perceptions on the basis of group identity can generate discrimination against any social out-group whose members are perceived as different based on socially constructed meanings attached
to perceived behavior.21
A third type of discrimination arises from negative reactions to
individuals or groups who act differently as a means of protest. Dissidents exemplify this third kind of acting differently; included in
this category are whistleblowers, who buck codes of loyalty and secrecy in work groups to expose organizational wrongdoing. In this
Article, I argue that retaliation against dissenters involves another
form of discrimination based on acting differently.22
Antidiscrimination law currently treats acts of discrimination
against persons with social disabilities, 23 members of social outgroups,24 and dissenters25 largely as separate forms of discrimination. My argument, based on social neuroscience, is that, at bottom,
each of these three varieties of illegal discrimination are much the
same. All arise from similar, neurally based phenomena. Antidiscrimination law should better recognize this.26
This Article is the last in a series of three I have devoted to the
general topic of antidiscrimination law and human beings acting differently.27 My prior articles focused primarily on legal doctrine, as
well as its development as a matter of civil rights history.28 This Article steps away from the details of law and legal history to take a
broader, tentative interdisciplinary social science perspective. With
the eyes of a neophyte, I explore the insights of experimental science—especially the relatively new interdisciplinary field called social neuroscience, which explores (among many other topics) how
21

See infra Section II.A.1.
See infra Section II.A.4.
23
See Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101–
12213 (2012).
24
See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a).
25
See id. § 2000e-3(a).
26
See infra Section II.A.1.
27
See Susan D. Carle, Angry Employees: Revisiting Insubordination in Title
VII Cases, 10 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 186 (2016) [hereinafter Carle, Angry Employees]; Carle, Social Impairments, supra note 18.
28
See, e.g., Carle, Angry Employees, supra note 27; Carle, Social Impairments, supra note 18; Susan D. Carle, Conceptions of Agency in Social Movement
Scholarship, 39 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 522 (2014) [hereinafter Carle, Agency].
22
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and why the brain tends unconsciously to discriminate against others
perceived to have behavioral differences.29
Legal scholars have long mined the findings of psychology to
assist them in constructing legal doctrine.30 Over the past few decades, they have begun exploring the research on implicit bias to help
explain why illegal discrimination continues to be rampant despite
decades of prohibition.31 It is important to point out at the outset that
implicit bias does not completely explain discrimination.32 It does
not, for example, capture the many complex historical and structural
forces that present “built-in headwinds” for traditionally excluded
outsiders.33 But the science on implicit bias can provide part of the
explanation for the complex phenomenon of persistent discrimination in U.S. society.34
In this Article, I mine social neuroscientists’ work on how and
why implicit bias occurs, focusing on the science about how the
brain automatically and non-volitionally processes cues that mark
persons as in-group versus out-group members.35 What often matters to the brain is not status or identity per se, but what the brain
perceives about how a person’s behavior reflects identity.36 These
findings suggest that antidiscrimination law, too, should focus more
on the links between perceptions of behavior—or “acting differently,” as I will put it throughout this Article—and discrimination.37
29

See John T. Cacioppo & Jean Decety, An Introduction to Social Neuroscience, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF SOCIAL NEUROSCIENCE 3, 7 (Jean Decety &
John T. Cacioppo eds., 2015) [hereinafter SOCIAL NEUROSCIENCE HANDBOOK].
30
See generally ANNE C. DAILEY, LAW AND THE UNCONSCIOUS: A PSYCHOANALYTIC PERSPECTIVE 38–73 (2017) (discussing the history of legal scholars’
use of psychology).
31
For a recent summary of the empirical literature showing the continuing
persistence of discrimination in U.S. workplaces, see Joseph A. Seiner, The Discrimination Presumption, 94 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1115, 1128–45 (2019).
32
See, e.g., Anthony G. Greenwald & Linda Hamilton Krieger, Implicit Bias:
Scientific Foundations, 94 CALIF. L. REV. 945, 950 (2006).
33
See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 432 (1971) (discussing discrimination based on “built-in headwinds”).
34
For a discussion of the historical development of the legal concepts of disparate impact and structural discrimination, see Susan D. Carle, A Social Movement History of Title VII Disparate Impact Analysis, 63 FLA. L. REV. 251 (2011).
35
See infra Sections I.A.2, I.C.
36
See infra Section I.A.2.
37
See infra Section II.A.1.
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The normative arguments that arise from this focus can produce
both modest and more far-reaching proposals. Modest proposals call
on judges, lawyers, scholars, legislators and others to focus on how
persons may be discriminated against based on how they are perceived to act in relation to their identities.38 In U.S. law today,39 statutory prohibitions on discrimination in employment—the area of antidiscrimination law on which I will focus here40—are limited to a
handful of types of status distinctions. In federal antidiscrimination
law, 41 these protected statuses are race and color, sex, national
origin, religion, 42 age, 43 and disability. 44 In the eyes of Congress,
only discrimination based on these statuses raises sufficient concerns to warrant antidiscrimination protections, usually because of
the severity of the nation’s history of mistreatment against these
identity groups.45 Put most simply, it is illegal for an employer to
discriminate against persons based on their status as members of traditional outsider categories.
38

See infra Section II.A.1.
To keep this project manageable, I focus exclusively on U.S. law, though
much could be gained from comparative approaches.
40
I focus on employment law because it is an area both rich in antidiscrimination theory and of large importance to contemporary U.S. society. See generally
CYNTHIA ESTLUND, WORKING TOGETHER: HOW WORKPLACE BONDS
STRENGTHEN A DIVERSE DEMOCRACY (2003) (presenting an extended argument
about the importance of workplace relations to U.S. society). Many of the points
I make in this Article concerning employment antidiscrimination law can easily
be extended to other antidiscrimination fields. See Carle, Social Impairments, supra note 18.
41
Some states protect against more types of status discrimination. The District of Columbia, for example, covers all of the statuses listed above, plus “marital status, personal appearance, sexual orientation, gender identity or expression,
familial status, family responsibilities, matriculation, political affiliation, genetic
information, . . . source of income, status as a victim of an intrafamily offense,
and place of residence or business.” D.C. CODE § 2-1401.01 (2019).
42
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e–2000e-17
(2012).
43
Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA), 29 U.S.C. §§
621–634 (2012).
44
Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101–
12213 (2012). Discrimination based on genetic information is also prohibited under the Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act of 2008, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000ff–
2000ff-11 (2012).
45
For ease of reference, I refer to these as “traditional outsider” categories.
39
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To be sure, illegal discrimination continues to occur based solely
on perceived status, i.e., based on visible markers connecting a person with a traditional outsider group.46 However, as many antidiscrimination theorists point out, much of this stark “first-generation”
discrimination has gone underground.47 In today’s second- (or even
third- or fourth-) generation landscape, discrimination often takes
place in a manner that is more subtle and complex.48
Social neuroscience adds science-based, empirically derived
discoveries about how the brain works, showing that it is often perceptions of behavior—i.e., acting differently—rather than social
identity per se, that triggers bias.49 These findings lend support to
longstanding reform proposals that would turn courts and other policy influencers’ attention toward the performance of identity, rather

46

For example, in tests involving two candidates with identical resumes, one
of whom has a “[w]hite sounding” name and the other a name perceived as likely
to be African American, the apparently white candidate is fifty percent (50%)
more likely to be called for an interview than the apparently African American
candidate. See Marianne Bertrand & Sendhil Mullainathan, Are Emily and Greg
More Employable than Lakisha and Jamal? A Field Experiment on Labor Market
Discrimination 1–3, 10 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Res., Working Paper No. 9873,
2003), http://www.nber.org/papers/w9873 (presenting results of a study finding
these results at a highly statistically significant level of certainty); see also THELTON E. HENDERSON CTR. FOR SOC. JUSTICE, U.C. BERKELEY SCH. OF LAW, EQUAL
OPPORTUNITY: THE EVIDENCE 7 (2012), https://www.law.berkeley.edu/files/thcsj
/EOTheEvidence.pdf (presenting statistical evidence on employment inequality);
Devah Pager & Hana Shepherd, The Sociology of Discrimination: Racial Discrimination in Employment, Housing, Credit, and Consumer Markets, 34 ANN.
REV. SOC. 181, 187 (2008) (finding that African Americans are more likely to be
unemployed and paid less than whites).
47
See, e.g., Susan Sturm, Second Generation Employment Discrimination: A
Structural Approach, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 458, 465−68 (2001) (defining firstgeneration discrimination as “deliberate exclusion or subordination based on race
or gender[,]” which “violated clear and uncontroversial norms of fairness and formal equality” and analyzing methods of addressing “second generation” discrimination, which is more difficult to detect and address than first generation discrimination).
48
Id. at 468. (“‘[S]econd generation’ most accurately refers to a subtle and
complex form of bias[,]” which is “difficult to trace directly to intentional,
discrete actions of particular actors.”).
49
See infra Section I.A.1.
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than identity per se, in detecting and rectifying illegal discrimination.50 These findings suggest some other relatively modest doctrinal
reforms as well, as I will discuss in Section II.A.
A more far-reaching proposal would call on policy influencers
to embrace a general human right “to act differently.”51 The broad
principle of promoting greater tolerance for human difference
emerges as a key point of consilience—meaning “agreement between the approaches to a topic of different academic subjects, especially science and the humanities”52— between social neuroscience and legal theory. Just as this principle emerges from social neuroscience, disparate legal scholars, writing in a variety of subfields
spanning antidiscrimination theory to civil rights history, have
moved toward such a concept.53 As I will show in Part II, leading
scholars in these fields have in recent decades begun to explore the
right to act differently, at least in an abstract, aspirational way.54
Current U.S. law comes nowhere near supporting such a broad
right, however, and it might be unworkable and even counterproductive to try to legislate tolerance in any event. 55 Recognition of a
general human right to act differently thus may not be best achieved
through legal prescription. Instead, valuing a general human right to
act differently may be an aspirational norm toward which antidiscrimination law can “nudge” society even without a direct, formal,
or “hard law” mandate.56 The time appears ripe to explore these possibilities arising from the emerging consilience between fields. This
Article sets out to do so.
This Article proceeds as follows. After this introduction, Part I
lays out the basic social neuroscience findings relevant to my argument. Part II links this social neuroscience to the ongoing conversation among legal antidiscrimination scholars, and traces the insights
50

See, e.g., DEVON W. CARBADO & MITU GULATI, ACTING WHITE?: RERACE IN “POST-RACIAL” AMERICA 1−4 (2013) (arguing that discrimination occurs in actors’ responses to how individuals “perform” protected identities).
51
See infra Section II.B.
52
Consilience, OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY (3d ed. 2015).
53
See infra Section II.B.1.
54
See infra Section II.B.1 (offering an extended discussion of this literature).
55
See infra Section II.B.2.
56
See infra Section II.B.2.
THINKING
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that emerge from such a mapping in order to discern fruitful paths
forward for antidiscrimination law and policy.57 Specifically, it recommends (1) expanding recognition of discrimination based not
only on protected status but also how persons are perceived as acting
differently; and (2) promoting antidiscrimination law’s broad principle—if not, at this point, doctrine itself—recognizing a general
right to “act differently” within reasonable bounds.58
Before continuing, it will be helpful to address some of the likely
objections a law-focused audience may raise to this project. The first
obvious question is, why turn to social neuroscience? To be sure,
overreliance on social science (or any other discipline), has many
dangers: One need only invoke the Nazis’ use of neuroscience to

57
See Greenwald & Krieger, supra note 32 (introducing the science concerning implicit bias to a legal audience); see also Erik J. Girvan, When Our Reach
Exceeds Our Grasp: Remedial Realism in Antidiscrimination Law, 94 OR. L. REV.
359 (2016) (proposing to expand antidiscrimination rights based on studies of implicit bias); Rachel D. Godsil & James S. Freeman, Race, Ethnicity, and Place
Identity: Implicit Bias and Competing Belief Systems, 37 U. HAW. L. REV. 313,
318−29 (2015) (researching literature on evidence of bias in the housing industry); Jerry Kang & Kristin Lane, Seeing Through Colorblindness: Implicit Bias
and the Law, 58 UCLA L. REV. 465 (2010) (examining how law and legal institutions should respond to new scientific discoveries on social cognition); Ann C.
McGinley, Discrimination Redefined, 75 MO. L. REV. 443, 449 (2010) (citing social neuroscience studies to explain unconscious bias in employment discrimination).
58
Of course, a reasonableness limit must apply when recognizing a right to
act differently. Liberal philosophers propose the limiting principle of not doing
harm to others. See generally JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 139 (David Bromwich & George Kateb eds., Yale Univ. Press 2003) (1859) (stating that persons
should be permitted to do whatever they want as long as they do not harm others).
Although line-drawing is an important issue, it will not be my goal in this Article
to take up this matter; instead, my focus is on detecting in both antidiscrimination
law and social neuroscience the emergence of a principle supporting an expanded
right to act differently.
An illustration of the complexity of determining the bounds of reasonableness
in recognizing a right to act differently comes from the literature showing that
sometimes even law-breaking behavior improves society. See, e.g., EDUARDO
MOISÉS PEÑALVER & SONIA K. KATYAL, PROPERTY OUTLAWS: HOW SQUATTERS,
PIRATES, AND PROTESTERS IMPROVE THE LAW OF OWNERSHIP at viii−ix (2010)
(summarizing their thesis that violating property laws can lead to positive social
change).
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horrific ends to win this point.59 However, this point does not prove
its opposite—i.e., that experimental science may not helpfully inform legal theory. The task is a pragmatic one: to use what is useful,
always with an appropriate dose of skepticism and detachment from
strong conviction; to discard what is not; and, as the proverb goes,
wisely to judge the difference. Whether this Article accomplishes
that middle way is up to the reader to decide. What I offer is a contribution to a complex collective project of looking for points for
joinder across fields of human knowledge (as well as points for interdisciplinary critique) in times that demand fully mining the best
ideas we can find.
Science does not answer value questions; it cannot tell us what
kind of society we should strive to achieve.60 Experimental social
science instead adopts a utilitarian moral outlook; it accepts that,
from a utilitarian perspective, prejudice is a counter-utilitarian waste
of human resources that society could put to higher value use.61
With these assumptions in place for purposes of establishing a starting place, this Article explores how social neuroscience might help
shape antidiscrimination policy and law.
Other pragmatic considerations motivate this project as well.
Current political and social conditions call for modes of discourse
anchored in information derived from the use of scientific methodologies. In a world of “alternative facts,”62 establishing verifiable

59

See Aleksandra Loewenau & Paul J. Windling, Nazi Medical Research in
Neuroscience: Medical Procedures, Victims, and Perpetrators, 33 CAN. BULL.
MED. HIST. 418, 418, 421−25 (2016) (examining unethical Nazi “medical
procedures as they relate to the field of neuroscience”).
60
Understanding Science: How Science Really Works, U.C. BERKELEY,
https://undsci.berkeley.edu/article/_0_0/whatisscience_12 (last visited Mar. 23,
2019).
61
See JOSHUA GREENE, MORAL TRIBES: EMOTION, REASON, AND THE GAP
BETWEEN US AND THEM 124–28, 189, 212 (2013) (explaining the theoretical connections between utilitarianism and science and arguing for the benefits of adopting a utilitarian moral framework).
62
See Eric Bradner, Conway: Trump White House Offered ‘Alternative
Facts’ on Crowd Size, CNN (Jan. 23, 2017, 12:38 PM), http://www.cnn.com/
2017/01/22/politics/kellyanne-conway-alternative-facts/index.html (reporting on
Trump advisor Kellyanne Conway’s use of the term “alternative facts”); see also
Piers Brendon, Death of Truth: When Propaganda and ‘Alternative Facts’ First
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and replicable findings matters far more than it did in the recent past.
Whereas two decades ago legal scholars enjoyed exploring postmodern theories on the relativity of truth, today the same scholars
find themselves extolling the ideas of the Enlightenment.63 These
ideas include the basic tenets of scientific thinking, which involve
generating valid empirical observations, testable hypotheses, and
replicable results.64 Empirically tested, well-documented, peer-reviewed, published, and replicated findings provide an initial groundwork for arguments about policies, principles, and values.65 They do
not end arguments but they should at least figure into the discussion.
Of course, political and ideological predispositions influence experimental social scientists’ (as all scholars’) interests.66 But the scientific method’s emphases on verification through statistical analysis and replication of findings provides a disciplining check. 67 I
therefore rely heavily on leading experts’ syntheses of research findings considered highly respected work in the field.68 From the cau-

Gripped the World, GUARDIAN (Mar. 11, 2017, 6:00 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/media/2017/mar/11/death-truth-propaganda-alternative-facts-grippedworld (taking an historical approach to the alternative facts phenomenon by analyzing various government regimes and their use of propaganda).
63
Anne Marie Lofaso, Workers’ Rights as Natural Human Rights, 71 U. MIAMI L. REV. 565, 608, 610–11 (2017) (noting the connection between Enlightenment and human rights values).
64
See id. at 612.
65
See Elaine McArdle, The New Empiricists, HARV. L. TODAY (May 4,
2015), https://today.law.harvard.edu/feature/the-new-empiricists/.
66
See Torsten Wilholt, Bias and Values in Scientific Research, 40 STUD.
HIST. & PHIL. SCI 92, 92–94 (2009).
67
Id. at 99.
68
In the past two decades, internal critics in the natural sciences have called
on researchers, including social psychologists, to adhere to tighter methodological
standards and ensure the replicability of their research results. See, e.g., Open Sci.
Collaboration, An Open, Large-Scale, Collaborative Effort to Estimate the Reproducibility of Psychological Science, 7 PERSP. ON PSYCHOL. SCI. 657, 657 (2012)
(describing “open, large-scale, collaborative effort to systematically examine the
rate and predictors of reproducibility in psychological science”); Harold Pashler
& Eric-Jan Wagenmakers, Editors’ Introduction to the Special Section on Replicability in Psychological Science: A Crisis of Confidence?, 7 PERSP. ON PSYCHOL.
SCI. 528, 528 (2012) (outlining the background of the replication crisis in science
generally and introducing a special collection of articles addressing recommended
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tious perspective of an interested outsider with an overlapping research agenda, I turn to recognized experts in social neuroscience
subfields to build a conversation between social neuroscience and
legal antidiscrimination theory.
Objections to this project can come from the obvious inability of
brain-based science to predict individual human behavior, along
with the related problems of attempting to use neuroscience evidence in particular legal cases.69 I hasten to point out that these are
not the topics of this Article. Nor do I in general venture into the
many thorny questions neuroscientists face about what regions of
the brain are involved in various neural functions; problems concerning the locations of various brain-based processes do not matter
to the questions I investigate here.70
paths forward in the social sciences). This development is leading to ongoing revision of the canon of well-accepted research findings. See Pashler & Wagenmakers, supra, at 528. This points to the need for skepticism about what we think we
know. In this Article, I exercise caution in my citation practices, relying on the
“best” recognized work even though I realize I may be overlooking other important work in doing so. As a fellow scholar who dislikes the phenomenon of
groupthink in my own field, I apologize in advance but feel the need to be guided
by authority in venturing into fields that are new for me.
69
See Judith G. Edersheim, Can Neuroscience Predict Human Behavior?,
HUFF POST: LIFE (Dec. 14, 2012, 10:58 AM), https://www.huffpost.com/entry/traumatic-brain-injury_n_2296203. The use of neuroscience in particular
cases is not my topic here. For that inquiry, see the burgeoning literature focusing
on the use of neuroscience in criminal law cases. See, e.g., Emily Hughes, The
Empathic Divide in Capital Trials: Possibilities for Social Neuroscientific Research, 2011 MICH. ST. L. REV. 541, 553−65 (using social neuroscientific studies
to understand jurors’ feelings toward capital defendants); Dale Larson, A Fair and
Implicitly Impartial Jury: An Argument for Administering the Implicit Association
Test During Voir Dire, 3 DEPAUL J. SOC. JUST. 139, 141 (2010) (studying the
effect of implicit bias in criminal trials where the defendant’s race is different
from the race of the jurors); Justin D. Levinson & Robert J. Smith, Systemic Implicit Bias, 126 YALE L.J. F. 406, 410–15 (2017), http://www.yalelawjournal.org/forum/systemic-implicit-bias (discussing implicit bias in the criminal justice system).
70
Indeed, as expert neuroscientist Dr. Terry Davidson pointed out in commenting on my Article at a WCL workshop, it is not clear that specific brain regions account for various activities. See Janelle Beadle & Daniel Tranel, Social
Neuroscience: A Neuropsychological Perspective, in SOCIAL NEUROSCIENCE
HANDBOOK, supra note 29, at 49, 56–58 (describing difficulties in determining the
specific brain areas responsible for cognitive processes).
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A final likely objection comes from the historical—and current—association of social neuroscience with a field that scholars
now call evolutionary biology. Many progressives oppose evolutionary biology’s claims that human social behavior arises from the
dictates of evolution. 71 It is certainly the case that many experimental social scientists with a natural science orientation are intellectually committed to a wide range of versions of evolutionary biology.72 One may reject evolutionary biology—or be agnostic or
skeptical (as I am)—and still find the experimentally based, replicated, and statistically significant findings of social neuroscience
highly interesting and informative (as I do). In other words, one need
not accept all of the intellectual commitments of natural sciencebased experimental psychology to gain a great deal from an interdisciplinary conversation. With these preliminaries cleared away, I
put that conversation in motion below.
I. THE INSIGHTS OF SOCIAL NEUROSCIENCE
A. Social Neuroscience Basics
1. INTELLECTUAL SOURCES
Most simply put, social neuroscience studies, from a natural science-based, broadly interdisciplinary perspective, how the “social
brain” works.73 As an interdisciplinary field,74 social neuroscience
borrows from many natural science traditions. From medical studies, social neuropsychologists borrow techniques that test what social deficits occur when persons experience brain damage in particular locations of the brain.75 Medical investigators have used this
71

For a helpful summary of this critical literature, see Rachel O’Neill, Feminist Encounters with Evolutionary Psychology, 30 AUSTRALIAN FEMINIST STUD.
345, 345−48 (2015) (introducing a multi-perspective symposium on this evolutionary psychology and summarizing existing literature critical of and defending
this field).
72
See, e.g., GREENE, supra note 61, at 23, 347–48 (expressing a commitment
to evolutionary theory).
73
Svenja Matusall et al., The Emergence of Social Neuroscience as an Academic Discipline, in SOCIAL NEUROSCIENCE HANDBOOK, supra note 29, at 9, 9.
74
Cacioppo & Decety, supra note 29, at 5 (noting that “[s]ocial neuroscience
emerged in the early 1990s as a new interdisciplinary academic field”).
75
Beadle & Tranel, supra note 70, at 49, 52.
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technique, known as brain lesion studies, for centuries.76 Social neuroscientists also use very new technologies, such as electromagnetic
brain mapping, to study how the brain responds to social stimuli.77
They draw on a multitude of other experimental methodologies to
study how the brain performs social behavior as well, including
game theory, computer modeling, behavioral economics, epidemiology, animal behavior studies, and experimental social and developmental psychology. 78
Social neuroscientists accept some of the premises of classic
philosophers and social theorists but reject others. Most significantly, they refute the Cartesian division of human consciousness
into a non-physical realm of the mind and a tangible, material realm
of the corporeal body. 79 Instead, social neuroscientists locate all
mental functioning in the physical brain and study it as such.80 They

76

Chris Rorden & Hans-Otto Karnath, Opinion, Using Human Brain Lesions
to Infer Function: A Relic from a Past Era in the fMRI Age?, 5 NATURE REVIEWS
NEUROSCIENCE 813, 813 (2004). For example, neuroscientists have determined
that persons with damage to the ventromedial prefrontal cortex show a reduced
“capacity for social emotions (e.g., compassion, empathy, [and] guilt),” even
though their ability to engage in utilitarian reasoning appears unaffected. Beadle
& Tranel, supra note 70, at 59.
77
Matusall et al., supra note 73, at 17–20.
78
See Cacioppo & Decety, supra note 29, at 6 (noting that social neuroscience draws on the behavioral and social sciences as well as the neurosciences to
investigate complex human behavior across multiple levels of analysis); Matusall
et al., supra note 73, at 9–10, 17–20 (discussing the contribution to social neuroscience of social psychology as well as brain neuroimaging studies, animal studies, behavioral economics, and psychiatry); infra Section I.A.2.
79
See Julian Paul Keenan et al., An Overview of Self-Awareness and the
Brain, in SOCIAL NEUROSCIENCE HANDBOOK, supra note 29, at 314, 314−15; see
also EDWARD O. WILSON, CONSILIENCE: THE UNITY OF KNOWLEDGE 96−97
(1998) [hereinafter WILSON, CONSILIENCE] (describing philosophers such as Descartes and Kant as having “failed models of the brain” and arguing that “the fundamental explanation of mind is an empirical rather than a philosophical or religious quest”).
80
See Keenan et al., supra note 79, at 315, 319–21. Social neuroscientists
even believe that they will soon locate the seat of consciousness, a puzzle that has
stymied philosophers for centuries. See EDWARD O. WILSON, THE SOCIAL CONQUEST OF EARTH 9 (2012) [hereinafter WILSON, SOCIAL CONQUEST] (“Within a
generation, we likely will have progressed enough to explain the physical basis of
consciousness.”).

672

UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 73:655

acknowledge a debt to Sigmund Freud for proposing that the unconscious plays a large role in human behavior, but view the substance
of most of his theories, which lack grounding in controlled experimentation, as wildly off base.81 Instead, social neuroscientists trace
their conception of the unconscious to the pioneering experimental
work of late nineteenth-century psychologists such as William
James. 82 Working in natural science-based, experimental disciplines, a broad range of scientists have come to a consensus, based
on a vast amount and variety of data, that powerful unconscious
mechanisms operate in the human brain to produce much human behavior, including many aspects social conduct.
2. THE ROLE OF THE UNCONSCIOUS IN SOCIAL BEHAVIOR
Over the past century, experimental findings have led researchers to become increasing convinced of the powerful role of the unconscious in even the most basic aspects of perception.83 Unconscious processes organize the unmanageably complex data we receive through our senses—especially through our eyes—so as to allow us to make our surroundings intelligible.84 The brain does this
so quickly and automatically that we are not aware of all the processing that takes place before we can even start to make sense of
our environment, both in its physical and social aspects.85
As most relevant to social behavior, the elegant experimental
work of two Israeli-born social psychologists, Dan Kahneman and
Amos Tversky, paved the way to the understandings scientists now
possess about the social brain.86 Their work became popular in legal
scholarship when Kahneman won the Nobel Prize for economics
and published a best-selling book entitled Thinking, Fast and Slow87

81

See LEONARD MLODINOW, SUBLIMINAL: HOW YOUR UNCONSCIOUS MIND
RULES YOUR BEHAVIOR 16–17, 33, 104 (2012); Keenan et al., supra note 79, at
315.
82
MLODINOW, supra note 81, at 31−33.
83
For a recent accessible introduction into this research, see generally id.
84
Id. at 35.
85
Id.
86
Deborah Smith, Psychologist Wins Nobel Prize, MONITOR ON PSYCHOL.
Dec. 2002, at 22, 22.
87
DANIEL KAHNEMAN, THINKING, FAST AND SLOW (2011).
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after Tversky’s death in 1996.88
Kahneman and Tversky discuss two distinct mental processes
that operate in human thought. 89 One, called “fast thinking,” is
rapid, intuitive, and automatic, occurring “with little or no effort” or
voluntary control.90 Kahneman adopted the label “System One” for
this fast, intuitive system.91 The other, called “slow thinking,” involves the attentive, deliberative, effortful, rational thought we typically associate with thinking. 92 For this second, more ponderous
and deliberative system, Kahneman adopted the label “System
Two.”93 Most interesting to Kahneman in the operation of System
One are the ways in which it preempts, aids, and often entirely substitutes for System Two.94 System One, as Kahneman explains, often performs brilliantly, allowing System Two to persist in its “indolent” ways.95
Kahneman and Tversky persuasively show that System One’s
unconscious, automatic, and rapid thought is crucial to human functioning in a host of ways, including social interaction.96 Yet, as they
further demonstrate, the thought processes of System One are also
error-prone and rife with many kinds of systematic biases. 97
Through a description of a series of simple yet brilliant experiments,
Kahneman and Tversky detect System One engaging in a wide range
of irrational forms of decision-making.98 Just a few of these include
“the marvels of priming,” where simply hearing a series of words
may change one’s behavior without any awareness.99 For example,
young adults asked to create sentences from the words “Florida, forgetful, bald, grey or wrinkle,” later walk down a hallway more

88
89
90
91
92
93
94
95
96
97
98
99

Smith, supra note 86.
KAHNEMAN, supra note 87, at 20.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 20–21.
Id.
Id. at 21–28.
Id. at 417.
See id. at 21–28.
Id. at 25–28.
See id. at 53–54.
Id.
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slowly than members of a control group do.100
In another telling example, experimenters gave subjects the following description of a person named Linda:
Linda is thirty-one years old, single, outspoken, and
very bright. She majored in philosophy. As a student,
she was deeply concerned with issues of discrimination and social justice, and also participated in antinuclear demonstrations.101
The experimenters then asked the subjects to rank the probability of a series of eight statements about Linda’s probable vocation,
which included the statements, “Linda is a bank teller,” and “Linda
is a bank teller and is active in the feminist movement.”102 By surprising margins, subjects ranked the second statement as more probable than the first, even though that decision is necessarily a logical
fallacy because a statement with two conditions cannot be more
probable than a statement with one. 103 This, Kahneman argues,
shows how human beings, through the operation of heuristics, privilege “representativeness” over logic.104 Subjects focus intently on
100
Id. at 53 (emphasis omitted). Other features of System One thinking include a tendency to associate causal relationships between events that occur randomly, id. at 74–77, and to “have intuitive feelings and opinions about almost
everything that comes your way,” id. at 97. Examples of this latter tendency toward intuitive snap judgments include liking or disliking strangers without knowing why, making predictions of success without analysis, answering questions one
does not understand, and relying on evidence one cannot defend. Id. Another type
involves illusions of memory or confabulation, through which people invent untrue memories to fill in gaps in what they do remember, all with no awareness that
they are doing so. See id. at 60–61; GREENE, supra note 61, at 299–30. Still other
examples involve misperceiving risk levels and probabilities, jumping to conclusions based on good stories rather than good evidence, and being wildly overconfident in estimates of one’s abilities and level of control over events. KAHNEMAN,
supra note 87, at 138, 209, 256. Experimental subjects similarly show irrational
aversion to losses and the powerful influence of what psychologists call “the endowment effect,” meaning that they place more value on things they currently
own than things they do not yet possess. Id. at 292–99.
101
Id. at 156.
102
Id. at 156–57.
103
Id. at 157–58. The percentage of University of California undergraduate
students who committed this error was eighty-nine percent (89%). Id. at 158.
104
See id. at 158–60.

2019]

ACTING DIFFERENTLY

675

the imagined whole of a person’s social identity based on just a few
factual clues and assume that one fact about a person’s characteristics necessarily predicts others, even though this logically is not
true.105
The force of Kahneman and Tversky’s work leaves little room
for denying that illogical stereotypes and other faulty heuristics operate frequently in human social thinking. Their work opened the
way for much more experimentation on the nature of System One
thought. 106 At this point, the great weight of evidence, gathered
through numerous scientific approaches, has confirmed the existence of fully unconscious, often illogically biased, System One processes in social behavior.107 A host of studies from a wide variety of
disciplines prove this fact.108
Studies show that the human brain processes huge amounts of
social information about human faces within milliseconds, even be-

105

See id. at 157–58.
See Smith, supra note 86.
107
See Ezequiel Morsella & John A. Bargh, Unconscious Action Tendencies:
Sources of “Un-Integrated” Action, in SOCIAL NEUROSCIENCE HANDBOOK, supra
note 29, at 335, 336–41. Some experiments testing for the existence of fully unconscious processes have produced astounding results. Neuroscientists have discovered, for example, that persons with damaged optic nerves that render them
unable to see can still accurately reach for objects placed before them. Id. at 337.
Human beings who lack sight can categorize, at a statistically significant level of
success, images of human faces that researchers put before them, even though
they cannot see those images. See MLODINOW, supra note 81, at 40. Researchers
“theorize” (in other words, speculate based on the available evidence) that even
though the optic nerves of these subjects are not functioning, other parts of the
social brain can still sense social identity. See id. at 40–41 (explaining this phenomenon of “blindsight”).
Experiments have also studied the way the social brain works unconsciously
in more expectable ways. For example, human subjects can distinguish between
the natural versus consciously induced smiles of strangers. WILSON, CONSILIENCE, supra note 79, at 112. They can detect, without being able to say why, that
someone is “untrustworthy,” which allows them to “avoid that person in future
situations without needing to [constantly] re-evaluate all of our previous interactions with the individual.” See William A. Cunningham et al., Attitudes, in SOCIAL
NEUROSCIENCE HANDBOOK, supra note 29, at 212, 212.
108
See, e.g., MLODINOW, supra note 81, at 40; WILSON, CONSILIENCE, supra
note 79, at 112.
106
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fore experimental subjects are aware that they are looking at a human face.109 As another example, the processes by which human beings quickly and intuitively grasp what other human beings are
thinking, which researchers often refer to as “theory of mind,” appears to be substantially non-volitional and unconscious as well.110
Similarly, the brain rapidly and automatically decides, prior to
deliberative judgment, who is similar to oneself and who is not.111
An enormous amount of research has documented that this unconscious social brain makes automatic and non-volitional positive associations with persons perceived to be similar to the subject, based
on even trivial similarities.112 To take another example, people regularly prefer other individuals who share their same birthday or first
name. 113 Researchers have found that people in most professions
like members of their own profession significantly more than members of other professions.114
Well-replicated experiments in development psychology reveal
that infants show a marked preference for their in-group members
even in the first months of life, with babies looking preferentially—
or for a longer time—at persons who speak their native language
well before they understand words.115 Another finding comes from
the “ultimatum game” in experimental behavioral economics. 116
This classic experiment involves giving one player, called the proposer, a sum of money, and then asking the proposer to offer to di-

109

See ROBERT M. SAPOLSKY, BEHAVE: THE BIOLOGY OF HUMANS AT OUR
BEST AND WORST 85 (2017); see also Alexander Todorv, Evaluating Faces on
Social Dimensions, in SOCIAL NEUROSCIENCE: TOWARD UNDERSTANDING THE
UNDERPINNINGS OF THE SOCIAL MIND 54, 54 (Alexander Todorov et al. eds.,
2011).
110
MLODINOW, supra note 81, at 86.
111
See id. at 86, 167–75.
112
Id. at 168.
113
See JONATHAN HAIDT, THE RIGHTEOUS MIND: WHY GOOD PEOPLE ARE
DIVIDED BY POLITICS AND RELIGION 239 (2012).
114
See MLODINOW, supra note 81, at 167. The only exception are lawyers,
who rate members of all professions at the same level of average likeability. Id.
115
WILSON, SOCIAL CONQUEST, supra note 80, at 60.
116
Saaid A. Mendoza et al., For Members Only: Ingroup Punishment of Fairness Norm Violations in the Ultimatum Game, 5 SOC. PSYCHOL. & PERSONALITY
SCI. 662, 663 (2014).
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vide that sum between herself and another player, called the responder.117 The responder then chooses whether to accept or reject
the proposal.118 If the responder accepts, the players split the money
according to the proposer’s offer.119 If the responder rejects the proposal, neither player receives any money.120 Experiments repeatedly
find that proposers reward more money to responders who are arbitrarily designated as fellow in-group members than to responders
who are identified as out-group members—even when an option is
to award the money so that both groups end up with more.121 In other
words, human focus on in-group likeness is so strong that it outweighs the classic economic assumption that individuals act to maximize self-interest.122
Experiments in political science have similarly shown the effects
of group identity on human judgment and political views.123 Experiments have even shown that people perceive facts about the actions
117

Id.
Id.
119
Id.
120
Id.
121
Pascal Molenberghs, The Neuroscience of In-Group Bias, 37 NEUROSCIENCE & BIOBEHAVIORAL REVIEWS 1530, 1531 (2013) (citing Henri Tajfel et al.,
Social Categorization and Intergroup Behaviour, 1 EUR. J. SOC. PSYCHOL. 149,
173 (1971)).
122
See id.
123
See, e.g., JONAH BERGER, INVISIBLE INFLUENCE: THE HIDDEN FORCES
THAT SHAPE BEHAVIOR 105–07 (2016). In one experiment, researchers showed
subjects who identified as liberal Democrats a social policy that imposed stringent
restrictions on welfare benefits. Id. at 106. These subjects liked the policy far more
if experimenters told them that other Democrats liked it than they did if they did
not have information about other Democrats’ views. Id. If the researchers told the
subjects that Republicans liked the policy, the Democrats staunchly opposed it.
Id. Conversely, Republicans liked generous welfare policies if told that other Republicans liked them. Id. at 105. When asked why they held such views, both
groups failed to recognize the influence of the members of their fellow ingroups—i.e., those with the same political party affiliations. Id. at 106. Instead,
they attributed their views to their own deliberative processes, thus demonstrating
that one can be completely unconscious of the powerful effects of social influences. Id.
Professor Berger further describes the ways in which product marketing takes
advantage of people’s unconscious desires to use their product and lifestyle
choices to signal their identity as members of particular kinds of groups. See id.
at 122 (noting that some product choices, such as cars, signal identity more than
118
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of political in-group members differently than facts about out-group
members. In one classic experiment, researchers showed a video recording of a controversial, roughly played football game between
Princeton and Dartmouth Universities to students from the two
schools.124 Students from Princeton counted Dartmouth players as
having committed more fouls, whereas students from Dartmouth
viewed the number of fouls committed by the two teams as equal.125
In effect, the researchers explained, the two groups of students had
viewed “a totally different game.”126
Yale Law Professor Dan Kahan and his colleagues conducted a
similar experiment where they tested how subjects viewed video
clips of anti-abortion protests at clinics. 127 The experiment found
that subjects holding anti-abortion views saw protestors commit

do others, such as choice of paper towels).
Years before, French sociologist Pierre Bourdieu undertook an investigation
into how tastes in music, art, furniture, and other material objects signal one’s
identity as members of various socio-economic classes. See PIERRE BOURDIEU,
DISTINCTION: A SOCIAL CRITIQUE OF THE JUDGMENT OF TASTE 6–10, 70–72
(Richard Nice trans., Routledge 2010) (1984).
So too, policy makers have sought to use these research insights to encourage
socially beneficial conduct. See RICHARD H. THALER & CASS R. SUNSTEIN,
NUDGE: IMPROVING DECISIONS ABOUT HEALTH, WEALTH, AND HAPPINESS 68
(2008). For example, researchers found that informing people that their neighbors
were conserving energy caused them to use less energy themselves. Id. at 68–69
(noting, additionally, that when households were informed that they were using
less energy than their neighbors, they increased their energy use). Nobel laureate
behavioral economist Richard Thaler and Cass Sunstein, a law professor who
worked on these ideas as Administrator of the White House Office of Information
and Regulatory Affairs under President Obama, utilized these insights in the writing of Nudge: Improving Decisions About Health, Wealth, and Happiness. Cass
R. Sunstein, HARV. L. SCH., https://hls.harvard.edu/faculty/directory/10871/Sunstein (last visited Mar. 23, 2019); Richard H. Thaler, U. CHIC. BOOTH SCH. BUS.,
https://www.chicagobooth.edu/faculty/directory/t/richard-h-thaler (last visited
Mar. 23, 2019).
124
Albert H. Hastorf & Hadley Cantril, They Saw a Game: A Case Study, 49
J. ABNORMAL & SOC. PSYCHOL. 129, 129–30 (1954).
125
Id. at 130, 132.
126
Molenberghs, supra note 121, at 1532 (citing Hastorf & Cantril, supra note
124, at 132).
127
Dan M. Kahan et al., “They Saw a Protest”: Cognitive Illiberalism and the
Speech-Conduct Distinction, 64 STAN. L. REV. 851, 864 (2012).
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fewer illegal acts than did subjects who favored access to abortion.128
These effects occur even when groups are newly created. In another example, experimenters randomly divided participants into a
“red” group and a “blue” group and then asked them to watch video
clips to determine which team’s members pushed a button faster.129
The experimenters had constructed the video clips so that the two
groups were exactly equivalent on this measure.130 Each team, however, judged members of their own team as faster.131 Another experiment found that people are more willing to donate money to ingroup members as opposed to out-group members who are in distress.132
Neuroscientists have sought to study the brain processes involved favoring in-group members through brain imaging studies.133 They found that people’s brains are more active when they
perceive members of their in-group being subjected to painful stimuli.134 Images of in-group members suffering pain activate the parts
of the brain that appear to be associated with feeling empathy,
whereas images of out-group members’ suffering can trigger areas
that appear to be connected with pleasure and schadenfreude.135 In
these studies of empathic response, “ethnic identification was the
largest predictor for in-group favoritism.”136
Neuroscientists currently believe that the brain processes involved in in-group versus out-group categorization are related to the
parts of the brain that process self-identity.137 Along with other psychologists, neuroscientists theorize that people assign more positive
feelings and higher social status to in-group members than to out128
See id. at 884 (finding that individuals who saw an identical video of abortion protesters reached different conclusions about what they saw based on their
cultural values).
129
Molenberghs, supra note 121, at 1532.
130
Id.
131
Id.
132
Id. at 1533.
133
See, e.g., id. at 1532–33.
134
Id. at 1533.
135
Id.
136
Id.
137
Id. at 1531–32; Samantha Morrison et al., The Neuroscience of Group
Membership, 50 NEUROPSYCHOLOGIA 2114, 2115 (2012).
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group members.138 Individuals produce positive self-esteem by assigning high social status to themselves and their identity group.139
In other words, a process of distinguishing “us” from “them” appears to create both self-identity and self-esteem. 140 Researchers
term this concept Social Identity Theory.141
The powerful non-volitional processes of constructing and locating one’s self-identity in relation to in-groups and out-groups has
important functions in social behavior. Evolutionary biologists postulate that these processes offered important evolutionary advantages, leading persons to be on guard against the potential dangers outsiders might pose.142 But one need not subscribe to evolution-based theories to accept the robust findings that humans do indeed categorize others into identity groups. From a functionalist social science viewpoint too, powerful, automatic, and non-volitional
feelings of loyalty toward fellow in-group members produce the
benefits of in-group coherence and cooperation, as well as competitive fever to excel and win. 143 From this perspective, the social
brain’s differentiation between in-groups and out-groups has important advantages, facilitating humans working in groups and
thereby developing cultures and other collective achievements.144
These same unconscious and non-volitional processes also have

138

See Molenberghs, supra note 121, at 1532.
Id.
140
See id.
141
Morrison et al., supra note 137, at 2115. Social identity theory proposes
that individuals take on the positive identifications associated with the groups to
which they belong and that this process is important to positive self-development.
See Dominic Abrams & Michael A. Hogg, Social Identification, Self-Categorization and Social Influence, 1 EUR. REV. SOC. PSYCHOL. 195, 196 (1990) (discussing social identity and self-categorization theory and tracing its intellectual roots
to Tajfel and other classic social psychologists).
142
See HAIDT, supra note 113, at 238.
143
Cf. MLODINOW, supra note 81, at 172 (noting that companies such as Disney, Apple, and Google strive to create a strong corporate culture but recognizing
that problems can arise when a company’s internal departments develop strong
group identities that cause in-group favoritism and out-group discrimination).
144
See HAIDT, supra note 113, at 204, 233.
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suboptimal side effects in contemporary conditions of social pluralism.145 In modern societies, fighting among social groups is often
counterproductive.146 Indeed, when protected characteristics are at
issue, such as race, gender, national origin, religion, disability, and
age—all characteristics that tend to be salient to individuals’ social
identity today—favoring one’s in-group and disfavoring the contrasting out-group constitutes the very definition of unlawful discrimination.147
At the extreme, the social construction of out-groups leads to
dehumanization148—in other words, the construction of human beings as less than human. 149 As social psychologists have documented, this type of process occurred in the world’s many incidents
of mass atrocities and genocide, where members of some groups
murder members of other groups as a result of constructing their
group identity in hostile opposition to that of the out-group. Examples include the Rwandan genocide,150 the genocide in Darfur,151 the
Nazi Holocaust,152 and Cambodia’s killing fields,153 to name just a
few. Social neuroscientists have begun to study the neural processes
involved in these atrocities. 154 Researchers have found that when
145
In GREENE, supra note 61, at 19–27, Joshua Greene makes this point powerfully.
146
See id.
147
See supra notes 41–44.
148
Lasana T. Harris & Susan T. Fiske, Dehumanizing the Lowest of the Low:
Neuroimaging Response to Extreme Out-Groups, 17 PSYCHOL. SCI. 847, 848
(2006).
149
In Spanish, the term for dehumanization is cosificación. As the Spanish
word for “thing” is cosa, cosificación literally translates to “turning into a thing.”
See Cosaficar, COLLINS DICTIONARY: ESPAÑOL – INGLÉS ENGLISH – SPANISH (4th
ed. 2002).
150
SAPOLSKY, supra note 109, at 571–72 (discussing the Hutu genocide of
Tutsis in Rwanda from the perspective of a social neuroscientist).
151
See REBECCA HAMILTON, FIGHTING FOR DARFUR: PUBLIC ACTION AND
THE STRUGGLE TO STOP GENOCIDE 16–25 (2011) (discussing the genocide in Darfur and the failure of international activists’ efforts to halt it).
152
See SAUL FRIEDLANDER, THE YEARS OF EXTERMINATION: NAZI GERMANY
AND THE JEWS, 1939–1945 (2007) (describing the Nazi Holocaust).
153
See CRAIG ETCHESON, AFTER THE KILLING FIELDS: LESSONS FROM THE
CAMBODIAN GENOCIDE (2005) (detailing the atrocities committed by the Khmer
Rouge).
154
See, e.g., Harris & Fiske, supra note 148, at 848.
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subjects are shown images of extreme outgroups—such as drug addicts and homeless people—the parts of the brain that trigger thinking about other human beings are not triggered at all. 155 Instead,
when experimenters showed images of members of these groups to
experimental subjects, the images activated regions of the brain associated with disgust.156 These findings support other evidence that
humans sometimes perceive out-group members as less than human,
corresponding with Erving Goffman’s classic and influential work
on stigma and dehumanization, 157 which I will discuss further in
Section I.C.3 below. In sum, the automatic neural processes that produce in- versus out-group thinking have benefits and pitfalls. The
same processes that produce human sociability, including group loyalty, cohesion, and the desire to pitch in and help, also produce the
downsides of out-group hostility and derogation.
This Part has surveyed experimental research from a variety of
disciplines, including not only behavioral economics but also political science, social psychology, game theory, and similar fields. Yet
even though the underlying processes of the unconscious social
brain are essentially the same across the realms of politics, economics, and social relations, scholars allied with different disciplines
sometimes fail to appreciate that their work flows from the same
fundamental discovery of the unconscious social brain. Conservative legal scholars who enthusiastically appreciate Kahneman and
Tversky’s work, for example, tend to dismiss the research on implicit bias, even though it all flows from the same foundation.158
This Article stands as a call for scholars to abandon these disciplinary and political silos—which are, after all, just another type of us
versus them thinking.
B. Underappreciated Social Neuroscience Insights
With a short introduction to the social neuroscience study of the
155

Id. at 847–48.
Id. at 850.
157
ERVING GOFFMAN, STIGMA: NOTES ON THE MANAGEMENT OF SPOILED
IDENTITY 5 (1963).
158
See, e.g., Michael Selmi, The Paradox of Implicit Bias and a Plea for a New
Narrative 4–5, 18 (Aug. 24, 2017) (unpublished manuscript), https://scholarship.law.gwu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2558&context=faculty_publications.
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neural workings of in-group favoritism now out of the way, we are
ready to turn to this interdisciplinary field’s most well-known findings as relevant to antidiscrimination law—namely, the multitude of
studies on unconscious bias. Social scientists widely accept the science underlying implicit bias testing (or implicit association testing,
“IAT”), which they have replicated across many studies, disciplines,
nations, and group conditions.159 Antidiscrimination theorists have
recognized that these studies have much to offer legal theorists’ understanding of discrimination.160 But the uncontestable facts about
the existence of unconscious bias only scratch the surface of what
social neuroscience can teach legal antidiscrimination theorists. Below, I present two examples of insights from implicit bias studies
that legal theorists should further pursue.
1. DETECTING IMPLICIT BIAS IS NOT (COMPLETELY) A BAD THING,
AT LEAST AS COMPARED TO THE ALTERNATIVE
To study the phenomenon of bias that arises from the brain’s
processes of social categorization, researchers have developed
methods for measuring degrees of bias.161 Researchers have used a
method that incorporates the “Stroop task.”162 The Stroop task most
often consists of requiring participants to name the ink color of a
written color word.163 The task is most mentally taxing when the ink
color of the word is different from the color the word spells out, for
example, requiring the participant to identify that the word “pink” is
in the ink color “blue.”164 The method measures bias by calling on
participants to perform the Stroop task after a task that activates the
159
See Russell H. Fazio & Michael A. Olson, Implicit Measures in Social
Cognition Research: Their Meaning and Use, 54 ANN. REV. PSYCHOL. 297, 298–
99 (2003) (recognizing that there has been a surge of interest in the use of implicit
bias tests in social psychology research).
160
See, e.g., Tanya Katerí Hernández, One Path for “Post-Racial” Employment Discrimination Cases–The Implicit Association Test Research as Social
Framework Evidence, 32 L. & INEQ. 309, 310–12 (2014).
161
See, e.g., Cunningham et al., supra note 107, at 219–20.
162
Ronald Chen & Jon Hanson, Categorically Biased: The Influence of
Knowledge Structures on Law and Legal Theory, 77 S. CAL. L. REV. 1103, 1141
n.154 (2004); see also Overview, PROJECT IMPLICIT, https://implicit.harvard.edu/implicit/education.html (last visited Mar. 30, 2019).
163
See Cunningham et al., supra note 107, at 220.
164
Id.
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automatic neural systems involved in out-group prejudice, such as
viewing faces of inviduals of different races.165 Studies consistently
show that participants take longer to perform the Stroop task when
their mental processes are dealing with the burden of trying to counter their implicit biases.166 The longer the delay, scientists assume,
the greater the force of the automatic processes involved in implicit
bias that the subject is working to suppress.167
Results show that most experimental subjects have a statistically
significant slower response time when asked to associate positive
ideas or words with words, images, or faces associated with outgroups.168 In the United States, for example, subjects show slower
response times in connecting positive associations with persons belonging to racial minorities.169 Members of racial minority groups
on average show some bias against other members of their own
groups, although this negative bias toward fellow minorities is typically less severe for members asked to rate members of their own
groups than for dominant race persons asked to rate members of
other groups. 170 Among the dominant racial group—i.e., in the
United States, among whites—a wide range of implicit bias scores
exists.171 Average scores vary by region of the country as well as
other variables.172
Reaction time testing is most often aimed at measuring bias
165

See id.
See, e.g., id. (describing multiple studies using the Stroop task).
167
See id.
168
See, e.g., Charles W. Perdue et al., Us and Them: Social Categorization
and the Process of Intergroup Bias, 59 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 475,
477–79 (1990).
169
See, e.g., Anthony G. Greenwald et al., Measuring Individual Differences
in Implicit Cognition: The Implicit Association Test, 74 J. PERSONALITY & SOC.
PSYCHOL. 1464, 1473–76 (1998) (finding that whites respond more slowly to
“pro-Black” examples).
170
See, e.g., David S. March & Reiko Graham, Exploring Implicit Ingroup
and Outgroup Bias Toward Hispanics, 18 GROUP PROCESSES & INTERGROUP RELATIONS 89, 95–100 (2014).
171
See Chris Mooney, Across America, Whites Are Biased and They Don’t
Even Know It, WASH. POST (Dec. 8, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com
/news/wonk/wp/2014/12/08/across-america-whites-are-biased-and-they-donteven-know-it/?utm_term=.dccd4d399ccc.
172
See id. (providing a regional map showing states with different measured
levels of implicit bias).
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based on race and ethnicity (and gender, though gender will not be
my focus here).173 Many legal scholars have pointed to implicit bias
research to explain why decision-makers take adverse employment
actions against traditionally excluded outsiders despite their conscious efforts to act with good will and without prejudice.174 IAT
thus helps explain the statistics showing that employment discrimination persists despite a half-century’s prohibition. 175 However,
IAT solely proves the existence of unconscious bias; it does not in
itself explain why such bias occurs.176
Researchers have sought to explain the processes in the brain
that account for IAT results.177 What seems important, according to
a group of experts who recently summarized this literature, is that
subjects have formed the goal of avoiding racial or other bias in their
decision-making. 178 This is because the IAT measures the efforts of
the brain to suppress prejudiced thoughts that the subject does not
want to have.179 The delay in response time reflects the brain’s effortful work to suppress stereotypes and prejudicial attitudes—what
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See, e.g., Hernández, supra note 160, at 322.
See, e.g., Russell G. Pearce et al., Difference Blindness vs. Bias Awareness:
Why Law Firms with the Best of Intentions Have Failed to Create Diverse Partnerships, 83 FORDHAM L. REV. 2407, 2407–08, 2422–25 (2015) (describing a
study that found that elite law firm partners gave significantly higher evaluations
to identical memoranda when they were told they had been drafted by white associates than when they were told that the associates were black, despite their
firms’ generally good intentions to promote equity and inclusion for people outside the dominant racial group).
175
See, e.g., Leora F. Eisenstadt & Jeffrey R. Boles, Intent and Liability in
Employment Discrimination, 53 AM. BUS. L.J. 607, 608–10 (2016) (applying the
lessons of implicit association testing to analyze the state of employment discrimination law); Hernández, supra note 160, at 310–12 (arguing that courts and legislatures should consider implicit bias a reason for reforming doctrinal standards);
Pearce et al., supra note 174, at 2441 (finding that lawyers bring their implicit
biases to their work). In 1964, Congress enacted Title VII of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241.
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Hernández, supra note 160, at 321–22.
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See Dylan D. Wagner et al., Staying in Control: The Neural Basis of SelfRegulation and Its Failure, in SOCIAL NEUROSCIENCE HANDBOOK, supra note 29,
at 360, 369.
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See id. at 369; Cunningham et al., supra note 107, at 220.
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See Wagner et al., supra note 177, at 369.
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neuroscientists call “cognitive control.”180 The IAT measures how
much cognitive control subjects are exerting.181 Subjects with a high
drive not to be, or at least appear, prejudiced engage in cognitive
control to suppress prejudiced thoughts, and because they are doing
so, their response times are slower.
But, people who do not have a high drive to appear non-prejudiced—in other words, people who feel free to feel and express negative stereotypes about out-groups—engage in less cognitive control.182 Read this way, the oft-replicated results of IAT testing are
actually something of a good sign. This is because the only alternative to finding evidence of effortful cognitive control to resist implicit bias in judgments about out-groups is less effort at cognitive
control, which corresponds to less of a goal-directed drive to avoid
being prejudiced. Put more plainly, a person who demonstrates implicit bias is better than a blatant bigot. As I will discuss further in
Part II below, these conclusions lead to important doctrinal and policy insights.
2. RACISM DOES NOT APPEAR TO BE “HARD WIRED” INTO THE
HUMAN BRAIN
A conclusion people may reach when they learn about implicit
bias testing is that racism must be “hard wired” into the brain.183
However, this is a misconception. As leading evolutionary biologists point out, the notion that racism arose as a byproduct of human
evolution rests on a logical and scientific fallacy.184 What human
180

Id. at 368–69.
Id. at 369.
182
Id.; see also Todd F. Heatherton & Dylan D. Wagner, Cognitive Neuroscience of Self-Regulation Failure, 15 TRENDS COGNITIVE SCI. 132, 132–37 (2011)
(explaining why cognitive control fails).
183
See Rob Waugh, Racism Is ‘Hardwired’ into the Human Brain - and People Can Be Prejudiced Without Knowing It, DAILY MAIL (June 26, 2012, 6:33
AM),
http://www.dailymail.co.uk/sciencetech/article-2164844/Racism-hardwired-human-brain--people-racists-knowing-it.html (asserting that “[r]acism is
hardwired into the brain”). But see Are We Hard-Wired to Be Racist?, NPR (Dec.
4, 2008, 9:00 AM), https://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=
97802442 (discussing that stereotypes and associations can be changed).
184
Gianfranco Biondi & Olga Rickards, The Scientific Fallacy of the Human
Biological Concept of Race, 42 MANKIND Q. 355, 374–78 (2002) (arguing that
race is not a byproduct of human evolution).
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brains are sensitive to and prone to hostility about is not skin color
or facial features per se, but any relevant socially constructed difference. 185 According to evolutionary biologists, it makes no logical
sense to propose that evolution hard wired the human brain to respond negatively to phenotypic differences because, during the vast
span of humans’ evolutionary history, during which group survival
influenced the evolution of the human brain, our ancient ancestors
typically would not have encountered persons of different races.186
This relevant period, natural scientists point out, stretches back more
than 60,000 years.187 The differences that were salient to group survival in this very long-ago evolutionary past involved linguistic and
other cultural differences among neighboring groups that were phenotypically very similar.188
To evolutionary biologists, this typical lack of interaction with
people of different races in the long arc of evolutionary history suggests why human brains are so extremely sensitive in noticing any
socially salient difference.189 What differences are relevant depends
on socially constructed meanings that vary widely across time and
place.190 On this theory, System One processes in the brain notice
and react to subtle social differences that, in very old evolutionary
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Cf. HAIDT, supra note 113, at 239 (arguing that to create a cohesive group
one should make racial differences less relevant by highlighting other similarities
in the group).
186
See GREENE, supra note 61, at 52 (“[O]ne would expect the human mind’s
social sorting system . . . [to sort] people based on culturally acquired characteristics, such as language and clothing, rather than genetically inherited physical
features.”); HAIDT, supra note 113, at 239 (“There’s nothing special about race.”);
SAPOLSKY, supra note 109, at 407 (pointing out that “there is no evolutionary
legacy of humans encountering people of markedly different skin color”).
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See MARK PAGEL, WIRED FOR CULTURE: ORIGINS OF THE HUMAN SOCIAL
MIND 48 (2012) (explaining that modern humans left Africa 60,000 to 70,000
years ago and spread far apart). Of course, the timeline for evolution of Homo
sapiens stretches back far longer, as predecessor hominid species evolved to produce Homo sapiens.
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Id. at 49–54 (discussing the great density of language differences among
pre-modern societies); GREENE, supra note 61, at 52.
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See, e.g., PAGEL, supra note 187, at 57.
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terms, allowed group members to make quick determinations imperative to their survival.191 System One decides whether other people’s behavior exhibits markers that they are probably safe as fellow
in-group members or, in the alternative, may be potentially dangerous members of an out-group.192
Experimental psychology research supports evolutionary biologists’ view. For example, experiments have shown that subjects stop
noticing race (but not gender)193 when they are told that a characteristic other than race is the important marker differentiating members
of their in-group from an out-group.194 Thus, subjects shown a series
of photos and asked to remember faces noticed race when not given
another classification criteria.195 When researchers gave a different
group the same set of photos and told them that the players wearing
gray were the members of their team and the players wearing yellow
were the members of the opposing team, these subjects remembered
the color of players’ uniforms rather than their race.196
C. The Creation of In- Versus Out-Groups
The research I have described thus far examines the evidence
that the social brain has unconscious tendencies to construct inferior
“others” and engage in discrimination against them. This Section
delves more deeply into what empirical researchers (as opposed to
speculative evolutionary psychologists) currently understand about
191
Michael J. Manfredo et al., Considerations in Representing Human Individuals in Social-Ecological Models, in UNDERSTANDING SOCIETY AND NATURAL
RESOURCES: FORGING NEW STRANDS OF INTEGRATION ACROSS THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 137, 140 (Michael J. Manfredo et al. eds., 2014).
192
See id.
193
Evolutionary biologists argue that the brain continues to notice gender because gender had an important role in evolution. See, e.g., GREENE, supra note
61, at 53 (discussing Robert Kurzban et al., Can Race Be Erased? Coalitional
Computation and Social Categorization, 98 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. 15,387
(2001)); see also WILSON, CONSILIENCE, supra note 79, at 170 (“The optimum
sexual instinct of men . . . is to be assertive and ruttish, while that of women is to
be coy and selective.”). Evolutionary biologists provoke feminists’ ire (including
mine) when they assert the naturalness of sex-based differences, but this topic is
too complex to take on in the limited space of this Article.
194
Kurzban et al., supra note 193, at 15,391; see also GREENE, supra note 61,
at 53 (discussing Kurzban et al., supra note 193, and other studies).
195
Kurzban et al., supra note 193, at 15,388–89.
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why such “us versus them” thinking takes place.
Humans show an immense capacity to work cooperatively, on
one hand, yet view some people as outsiders with whom they do not
want to cooperate, on the other. Social scientists believe that these
two tendencies are flip sides of the same coin: Defining some persons as outsiders helps one to construct a group of insiders—i.e.,
people one trusts and wants to cooperate with to accomplish collective ends. Psychologists further believe that preferring one’s fellow
in-group members helps cement one’s grasp of the social and behavioral norms one should strive to apply to oneself. Group members want to be like, or conform to, others in their in-group. An important part of social psychologists’ study of social behavior has involved investigating the neural underpinnings of this desire to conform.
1. CONFORMITY
We see humans’ desire to conform to the expectations of their
in-groups every day in social settings.197 We experience it within
ourselves on a constant basis.198 Yet social neuroscience discovered
how this tendency to imitate others occurs at a neural level only
fairly recently, and then by accident.199 According to the oft-told
story, 200 this discovery occurred as Italian neurologists were conducting brain scans on macaque monkeys.201 A graduate student entered the room eating an ice cream cone.202 To the scientists’ surprise, parts of the monkey’s brain that activate for planning and initiating its own movement started firing as the monkey watched the
graduate student eat.203 Investigating further, the scientists discovered that the same parts of the monkey’s brain activated when it
watched somebody pick up a banana and when it picked up a banana
itself.204 These observations led the scientists to propose the existence of what have come to be popularly termed “mirror neurons,”
197
198
199
200
201
202
203
204

See BERGER, supra note 123, at 27–28.
Id.
See id. at 33–35.
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Id. at 33–34.
Id. at 34.
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which encourage the brain to perform behaviors it sees others doing.205
After first discovering mirror neurons in monkey brains, neuroscientists found something like them in human brains as well.206 Today, research documents that human brains, like those of nonhuman
primates, “automatically imitate the postures, facial expressions,
emotional expressions, and speaking styles of others.”207
Experiments in social psychology and behavioral economics
have shown that the tendencies to imitate others facilitate cooperation; for example, behavioral mimicry greatly increases the chance
that people in negotiations will reach a deal.208 Scientists thus believe that the unconscious System One tendency of primate brains
toward imitation “increase[s] liking and bonding between the individuals—serving as a kind of natural ‘social glue.’”209 Imitation is
an automatic process of the social brain that signals likeness, i.e., the
fact that I act like you shows “that we have things in common or are
part of the same tribe,”210 which in turn facilitates cooperation and
agreement.
The study of group conformity has long roots in the intellectual
history of experimental social psychology. A bit of backtracking
will pay off in illuminating the basis for more contemporary work.
The reader already familiar with or less interested in this intellectual
history can skip ahead to Section I.C.1.ii.
i. Classic Studies
Turkish-born social psychologist Muzafer Sherif conducted
some of the first experiments on group conformity.211 Known for his
ingenious experimental designs, Sherif completed his dissertation,
entitled Some Social Factors in Perception, at Columbia University
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Id.
207
Morsella & Bargh, supra note 107, at 341.
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in 1935.212 A key experiment involved bringing subjects in groups
of two or three into a darkened room, where they together watched
a small dot of light shining on a wall.213 The light remained stationary, but continuing to stare at the light made it appear to move, a
phenomenon known as the auto-kinetic effect.214 The experimenter
instructed the participants to estimate aloud how far the light was
moving.215 Sherif showed that with repeated trials the subjects converged on similar estimates about the distance covered by the motion of the light.216 Between groups, the estimates varied widely, but
within groups they became very similar over repetitions. 217 This,
Sherif proposed, reflected the development of a social norm—i.e., a
shared intra-group understanding of facts about the world—even
though these agreed-upon “facts” had no actual basis in the physical
world.218
To further test whether differential group norms would endure
outside the pressure of being in a group, Sherif invited his subjects
back on another day to repeat the experiment.219 This time he put
each participant in the darkened room alone to watch the dot of
light. 220 Sherif found that members of groups that had estimated
short distances for the light’s movement continued to estimate short
distances when watching the light alone, and members of groups
that had previously estimated longer distances continued to estimate
longer distances, even though they were now outside the influence
of their groups.221 Sherif thus proposed that individuals retain group
perceptions even when they are no longer with the group.222
Another important early social psychologist, Solomon Asch, ascribed his interest in social conformity to his personal connections
212
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to the Holocaust as a Polish Jew.223 Asch took Sherif’s inquiry further. The auto-kinetic effect involved an ambiguous phenomenon,
but Asch wanted to investigate group influence on matters of observable fact that were unambiguously true or false.224 To do this,
Asch asked small groups of experimental subjects to match lines of
varying lengths. 225 All of the members of the group, except one,
were in league with the experimenter and had been instructed to state
incorrectly which lines corresponded in length. 226 In the groups,
each participant was instructed to state his answer aloud and the “naïve” subject (i.e., the one who was not conspiring with the experimenter) was always asked to give his answer last.227
Asch found that over repeated trials approximately one third of
the naïve subjects conformed their answers to the incorrect answers
given by the others in the group.228 Approximately three quarters of
the participants conformed incorrectly at least once (meaning that
one fourth never conformed).229 In contrast, in a control group, in
which different participants were asked to judge individually which
lengths of lines matched, only five percent (5%) ever got the answers wrong.230
Asch’s experiment showed that people conform to group ideas
even when they contradict objective facts. Subsequent experiments
modelled after Asch’s added new neuroscience technologies to
measure participants’ conformity to wrong group answers on a task
that involved mentally manipulating a three-dimensional image.231
These experiments produced the same results: a substantial percentage of the subjects (though not all) conformed to objectively wrong
answers at least some of the time.232
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By the 1960s, experimental psychologists had entered into a period in which their research preoccupations and experimental methodologies had changed considerably from the dominant styles of the
1950s.233 Rather than continuing to test perceptions of the physical
world, some social psychologists turned their attention to testing
group conformity in situations raising moral imperatives.234 Stanley
Milgram of Yale University conducted the most famous of these experiments, in work that continues to be taught in ethics and psychology classes to this day.235
Like Asch, Milgram came from an American Jewish family and
attributed his interest in group influence to having met relatives who
suffered in Nazi death camps. 236 While investigating group conformity, Milgram discovered that individuals obeyed authority even
when they were not in a group.237 In the summer of 1960, during the
trial of Nazi war criminal Adolf Eichmann in Jerusalem, Milgram
developed an experimental design that he hoped would test the extent to which ordinary people would obey commands from an authority to do something as morally wrong as inflicting severe pain
on other people simply because they were ordered to do so.238
The results of the Milgram experiment have been replicated
many times in many settings around the world.239 In Milgram’s experiment, test subjects designated as “teachers” followed the experimenters’ instructions to deliver to a person cast as a “learner” what
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Id. at 63 (suggesting that it is “certainly possible that this was the event that
crystallized the obedience research in Milgram’s mind”); see also Nestar John
Charles Russell, Milgram’s Obedience to Authority Experiments: Origins and
Early Evolution, 50 BRIT. J. SOC. PSYCHOL. 140, 157 (2011) (quoting Milgram’s
correspondence to a graduate assistant referring to Eichmann).
239
Researchers have replicated the Milgram experiment through multiple
studies in Europe, Asia, and Africa. See PHILIP ZIMBARDO, T HE LUCIFER EFFECT:
UNDERSTANDING HOW GOOD PEOPLE TURN EVIL 275 (2007).
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appeared to be increasingly severe electric shocks.240 Sixty-five percent (65%) of the “teachers” continued to increase the shock dial far
beyond the level marked as painful or dangerous, turning the dial all
the way up to the top voltage possible, before which point the
learner’s screams of pain had been replaced with ominous silence.241
Many “teachers” protested and complained or expressed extreme
discomfort in obeying the experimenters’ commands to keep going,
but followed the instructions nevertheless.242 All teachers administered some level of shocks to the learners, but thirty-five percent
(35%) refused to continue at some point in the experiment.243
When Milgram varied the conditions of his experiment, he found
that moving it from the campus of Yale to a run-down office building in Bridgeport, Connecticut, and casting it as an experiment of a
private research firm lowered the rate of compliance somewhat, but
not to a statistically significant degree.244 A key variable that lowered rates of compliance was the presence of other subjects who refused to deliver the shocks.245 The presence of two dissenters lowered compliance rates to ten percent (10%).246
Milgram’s experiment remains the best-known and most vivid
240

ZIMBARDO, supra note 239, at 271.
See Stanley Milgram, Behavioral Study of Obedience, 67 J. ABNORMAL &
SOC. PSYCHOL. 371, 374, 376 (1963) (reporting that twenty-six out of forty subjects continued with the experiment to the highest purported shock on the generator).
242
ZIMBARDO, supra note 239, at 271.
243
Milgram, supra note 241, at 377 (detailing at what voltage levels these
subjects refused to continue).
244
ZIMBARDO, supra note 239, at 272.
245
STANLEY MILGRAM, OBEDIENCE TO AUTHORITY: AN E XPERIMENTAL
VIEW 119 (1974).
246
Id. at 116–19. Testers also refused more often when they were physically
closer to the learner. Id. at 34–36; see also ZIMBARDO, supra note 239, at 272
(discussing these variable results). Gender did not affect outcome. Female subjects were more likely to express distress in administering the shocks but did not
refuse to do so at a statistically significant different rate than males, a finding that
researchers have replicated in other study variations. MILGRAM, supra note 245,
at 62–63 (“The level of obedience was virtually identical to the performance of
men; however, the level of conflict experienced by the women was on the whole
higher than that felt by our male subjects.”); ZIMBARDO, supra note 239, at 276
(noting that the typical finding is that “there are no male-female gender differences in obedience”).
241
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demonstration of humans’ tendency to go along with others, but it
is not the only one.247 Other examples, too, demonstrate the strong
effects of what has come to be called “groupthink,” as I discuss further below.248

247

Other experiments found that pilots and nurses followed obviously incorrect instructions at shockingly high rates, pointing to significant public safety concerns. See ZIMBARDO, supra note 239, at 277–78 (describing studies of pilots and
nurses).
248
In 1954, Sherif conducted his own research on the effect of group processes
on moral behavior, using a project design he called the robber’s cave. See MUZAFER SHERIF, THE ROBBERS CAVE EXPERIMENT: INTERGROUP CONFLICT AND
COOPERATION 22–23 (1988). The robber’s cave involved twenty-four white,
Protestant, eleven-year-old boys from two-parent families who had been screened
for any symptoms of mental illness or other signs that they were “isolates” or
otherwise not “normal.” Id. at 34, 54. Sherif randomly divided them into two
matched groups and transported them to a Boy Scout camp at Robbers Cave State
Park in Oklahoma. Id. at 59. None of the boys knew each other before the experiment but they quickly bonded as groups, naming themselves the Eagles and the
Rattlers. See id. at 53, 84–85. For the first week, the researchers kept the two
groups apart from each other and led them in activities that required them to work
cooperatively and form common goals with their own groups. Id. at 36, 68–85.
The researchers then placed the two groups in a series of situations in which they
had to compete against the other group for scarce resources. See id. at 62. Intergroup friction immediately broke out, at first through name-calling and taunts but
continuing through acts of vandalism and even violence; the two groups set fires,
ransacked the other group’s cabin, and stole each other’s property. See id. at 109–
17, 150. Interviews and surveys showed that the boys had very favorable views
of members of their own group and very unfavorable attitudes about the respective
out-group. See id. at 189, 195–96.
The experimenters, who became dismayed at the extent of the intergroup
hostility they had engineered, then involved the two groups in new activities that
required cooperation rather than competition between the groups. See id. at 150.
They told both groups, for example, that the vehicle they needed for transportation
had broken down and everyone’s help was need to fix it. Id. at 171–72. Only after
these activities did the boys’ animosity toward members of their respective outgroups somewhat subside. Id. at 188.
Another classic field experiment designed to trigger the negative features
of human group identification involved social psychologist Phillip Zimbardo’s
1971 Stanford Prison Experiment. See Setting Up, STAN. PRISON EXPERIMENT,
http://www.prisonexp.org/setting-up (last visited Feb. 13, 2019) (presenting a
website about this experiment). Zimbardo recruited two dozen Stanford college
students for a week-long residential experiment acting in the roles of guards and
prisoners and found that the “guards” quickly began engaging in abusive behavior
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ii. Contemporary Research
Today no research review board would permit experiments on
human subjects as intense as the Milgram experiment.249 His work
raises too many ethical issues, especially in causing trauma to unwitting participants asked to engage in morally problematic conduct.250 Experimenters no longer can so easily explore ordinary people’s capacity for conforming to immoral directives, but research on
conformity continues, using the research methods of a different era.
Studies in business and social psychology, for example, document how conformity and a desire for interpersonal harmony can
cause groups to make suboptimal decisions.251 Asch discovered this
phenomenon decades ago when he showed that people tend to conform to the views first expressed in a group, even when those views
are objectively wrong.252 The contemporary literature emphasizes
that organizations and groups tend to reach better results if they encourage dissent and independent thinking and oppose “groupthink”
dynamics.253
The following example is representative of the results of many

toward the “prisoners.” Id.; see also ZIMBARDO, supra note 239, at 183–84 (describing the guards verbal and sometimes even physical abuse of those in the prisoner role). Zimbardo has published little of his data and it has not been subject to
peer review. See SAPOLSKY, supra note 109, at 466–67 (noting problems with the
scientific standards under which both the Stanford and Milgram studies were conducted).
249
See THOMAS BLASS, OBEDIENCE TO AUTHORITY: CURRENT PERSPECTIVES
ON MILGRAM PARADIGM 211 (2000).
250
See id.
251
See BERGER, supra note 123, at 58.
252
Id. at 58–59 (making this point about Asch’s findings in his line-length
experiment); JAMES SUROWIECKI, THE WISDOM OF CROWDS 38–39 (2004).
253
SUROWIECKI, supra note 252, at 29–31, 36–39 (noting experiments finding
that diversity of thinking in groups greatly improves the accuracy of collective
outcomes, but only if participants are each required to think independently rather
than subject to group influences); see Katherine W. Phillips, How Diversity Makes
Us Smarter, SCI. AM. (Oct. 1, 2014), https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/how-diversity-makes-us-smarter/ (summarizing the leading literature on the
benefits of diversity).
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experiments: When individuals in a group are each asked independently to guess the number of objects in a jar, the average of all
their guesses will be more accurate than that of ninety-seven percent
(97%) of the individuals guessing separately.254 This holds true only
if the individuals are not influenced by others’ guesses, however; if
participants have been influenced by learning what others think,
they will tend toward the group consensus and the improved accuracy will be lost255 (consistent with Sherif’s early experiments discussed in Section I.C.1.i above). The expertise and intelligence of
the individuals in the group are not what matters; the independent
diversity of their opinions is what does.256
Social neuroscience adds another layer to this knowledge. In a
version of the image rotation experiment described in Section I.C.1.i
above, researcher Gregory Berns brought naïve participants into
contact with the experiment’s “confederates” in a waiting room.257
The experimenters encouraged the participants to bond by playing
computer games together and taking photos of each other.258 The
experimenters then chose naïve participants and confederates to
look together at images of rotated 3D objects to determine whether
they were the same or different.259 The confederates were instructed
to give wrong answers in some trials and correct answers in others. 260 The researchers found that the naïve participants were far
more likely to give wrong answers after they heard other people give
wrong answers.261
Research on this phenomenon of groupthink underlies the call in
organizational management literature for diversity—not only on
race, national origin, gender and other social identity lines, but also
254
See SUROWIECKI, supra note 252, at 255; Jack L. Treynor, Market Efficiency and the Bean Jar Experiment, 43 FIN. ANALYSTS J., May–June 1987, at 50,
50.
255
See id.
256
SUROWIECKI, supra note 252, at 31, 36–37.
257
Gregory S. Berns et al., Neurobiological Correlates of Social Conformity
and Independence During Mental Rotation, 58 BIOLOGICAL PSYCHIATRY 245,
246 (2005). Here, confederates refers to the actors that the experimenters hired
who were in cahoots with the experiementers’ ruse. Id.
258
Id.; see also ZIMBARDO, supra note 239, at 264–65.
259
Berns et al., supra note 257, at 246.
260
Id. at 248.
261
Id.
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in a host of ways that allow groups to benefit from the wide variation
in human abilities, perspectives, personalities and experiences. The
cumulative weight of this research offers one of many sources of
experimental data that supports recognizing a human right to act differently, as I will discuss further in Section II.B below.262
The research on groupthink further shows that the tendency to
conform comes not only from the automatic brain processes that
positively encourage imitation and a desire to please others, but also
from powerful negative influences on the brain. These negative effects involve the brain’s reaction to the experience of social rejection. This phenomenon of “social pain” has been the subject of a
growing literature that deserves more attention in the legal literature,
as I discuss below.
2. SOCIAL PAIN
In brief, neuroscience shows that humans experience social rejection and exclusion as profoundly painful, even when it is relatively minor in scope or consequence to the individual affected.263
Public health studies, as well as the field of epigenetics, are only
now beginning to understand the full scope of the pain caused by
systemic oppression based on factors such as race and economic
class.264

262

Of course, one might still argue for a right to act differently on dignitary
grounds, even if the groupthink research did not support utilitarian justifications
for recognizing such a right. My point is not that recognizing this right is only
appropriate because (i.e., if) it is supported by utilitarian justifications. Rather, my
point is that this research provides an additional utilitarian justification to bolster
arguments political and legal theorists have also made on other moral grounds.
263
See Richard S. Pond, Jr. et al., Social Pain and the Brain: How Insights
from Neuroimaging Advance the Study of Social Rejection and Variants of Normal, in ADVANCED BRAIN NEUROIMAGING TOPICS IN HEALTH AND DISEASE METHODS AND APPLICATIONS 619, 620–21, 630 (Dorina Papageorgiou et al. eds.,
2014) (summarizing numerous studies on the brain effects of social exclusion);
Kipling D. Williams, Ostracism, 58 ANN. REV. PSYCHOL. 425, 444 (2007)
(“[E]ven for very brief episodes that have minimal mundane realism, ostracism
plunges individuals into a temporary state of abject misery . . . .”).
264
See Pond, Jr. et al., supra note 263, at 619 (summarizing numerous studies
on the brain effects of social exclusion).
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Experiments involving small-stakes games capture the phenomenon of social pain.265 In one experiment, participants take part in a
computer game in which experimenters tell them that they are playing a ball-tossing exercise with other people who are playing on
other computers located elsewhere. 266 In reality, the experimental
subjects are playing a game with a computer program.267 At first,
the ball comes to the experimental subject along with all the other
apparent “participants.”268 After a while, however, the ball does not
come to the experimental subject anymore.269 She suddenly finds
herself excluded from the game, while neuroimaging records her
brain’s response.270 The results show strong activation of parts of
the brain involved in experiencing pain, starting once the subject
starts being excluded and increasing as the exclusion continues.271
Social neuroscientists have established that when human beings
experience social pain, it registers as an intense experience.272 The
long-term effects of social pain are also striking.273 Psychologists
have found that, at one of the first stages of social exclusion, some
people try desperately to regain acceptance, even in ways that may
be harmful to them.274 Researchers theorize that these findings reflect the importance of social attachments to human beings’ ability
to survive, so that humans are “wired” to feel social rejection as a
terrible problem and to do whatever they think may help them to
regain entry into the group.275
At another stage individuals may accept their exclusion and
move away from the group, finding another source of acceptance if
265

Id. at 630.
Id.
267
Id.
268
Id.
269
Id.
270
Id.
271
Id.; see Williams, supra note 263, at 444; see also EMPIRISOFT,
http://www.empirisoft.com/cyberball.aspx (last visited Apr. 2, 2019) (providing
a downloadable link to this game); see generally Terry K. Borsook & Geoff MacDonald, Social Pain, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF SOCIAL EXCLUSION 163,
166–67 (C. Nathan DeWall ed., 2013).
272
Williams, supra note 263, at 444.
273
Id.
274
Id. at 432, 439.
275
Id. at 429–30, 439.
266
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possible.276 Individuals who do not find alternative sources of acceptance go through another phase in which the pain of social rejection leads to resignation and then to a host of negative physical and
social reactions, which can include anger and possible violence.277
It thus comes as no surprise, as studies have shown, that many of the
perpetrators of tragic mass shootings in past decades were social
outcasts during their youth.278 Of course, these are a tiny subset of
all those who have experienced prolonged social rejection, but it
might behoove policymakers to work on programs aimed at ameliorating social isolation among young people with the goal of helping
to prevent the long-term harms social isolation causes.
Other evidence on social pain draws on epidemiological data. A
large literature documents the connections between racism and adverse health consequences, including depression, anxiety, psychological stress, cardiac disease, and hypertension. 279 Exciting new
discoveries about epigenetics help explain this intergenerational
transfer of adverse consequences from trauma. Epigenetics involves
the study of the heritable transfer of switches that turn genes on and
off. 280 In one key study, scientists examined the descendants of
members of a Dutch community that suffered through five years of
starvation during World War II. 281 They found that even several
generations later, epigenetic effects continued.282 The researchers
documented the transfer of a host of adverse health effects caused

276

Id. at 442.
Id. at 442–44.
278
See, e.g., Mark R. Leary et al., Teasing, Rejection, and Violence: Case
Studies of the School Shootings, 29 AGGRESSIVE BEHAV. 202, 206–07 (2003).
279
For a survey and summary of this literature, see Yin Paradies et al., Racism
as a Determinant of Health: A Systematic Review and Meta-Analysis, PLOS ONE,
Sept. 23, 2015, http://europepmc.org/backend/ptpmcrender.fcgi?accid=PMC45
80597&blobtype=pdf.
280
SIDDHARTHA MUKHERJEE, THE GENE: AN INTIMATE HISTORY 392–93
(2016).
281
Id. at 393–94 (describing a study of a community in the Netherlands that
suffered from a five-year famine during World War II, which found that, several
generations later, the descendants of the individuals who lived through this famine
had statistically significant higher rates of the same health conditions caused by
famine as their ancestors had).
282
MUKHERJEE, supra note 280, at 394.
277
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by famine to the descendants of the famine survivors.283 Researchers are now investigating the epigenetics of racism—in other words,
how the health effects of racism are passed down from one generation to the next through the heritable switching on and off of
genes.284
This growing body of knowledge about social pain leads to the
following question: If the human brain is more or less “programmed” to conform, and if the penalties for failing to do so include the profound trauma of social pain, why is it that some people
do not go along with social norms? After all, in all studies on group
conformity discussed above, a significant minority of subjects did
not conform—i.e., some participants did not give wrong answers in
Asch’s experiments or turn the shock dial up to levels marked as
dangerous in Milgram’s experiment. The question thus arises: what
caused them not to go along? These questions are covered in the
study of deviance.
3. DEVIANCE
In the 1960s and 1970s, social scientists including Howard
Becker and Erving Goffman pioneered the study of deviance. 285
Becker, the father of contemporary approaches to the study of deviance, wrote a now-classic book titled Outsiders, in which he posited
that so-called deviants are socially constructed as such by an audience with the power to do so.286 As one contemporary expert explains, “[D]eviance . . . [is] any behavior that violates societal norms
283

Id.
See, e.g., Christopher W. Kuzawa & Elizabeth Sweet, Epigenetics and the
Embodiment of Race: Developmental Origins of US Racial Disparities in
Cardiovascular Health, 21 AM. J. HUM. BIOLOGY 2, 3–4 (2009) (investigating the
intergenerational effects of racism on cardiovascular health).
285
See Adam Gopnik, The Outside Game, NEW YORKER (Jan. 5, 2015),
https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2015/01/12/outside-game.
286
HOWARD S. BECKER, OUTSIDERS: STUDIES IN THE SOCIOLOGY OF DEVIANCE 8–9 (1997). Social psychologists call this approach constructivist or labelling theory—i.e., deviants become constructed as such because others label them
so. See Amanda Michiko Shigihara, Restaurants and Deviance: Theft in Professional Back Places, in ROUTLEDGE HANDBOOK ON DEVIANCE 506, 506 (Stephen
E. Brown & Ophir Sefiha eds., 2018) [hereinafter DEVIANCE HANDBOOK] (defining constructivist or labelling theory).
284
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and rules and therefore is met with negative reactions or sanctions.”287 In other words, persons labeled as deviant possess no inherent quality that makes them deviant; they simply act or appear to
act differently in a socially salient way. Thus, deviance signals a reaction to difference or diversity; difference becomes deviance when
some range of human difference is condemned.288 Put otherwise, ingroups with the power to do so define some individuals as “deviant”
according to some measure the in-group chooses to use. These
measures typically comprise social norms important to the group.289
This understanding of deviance as violations of a group’s norms
in a manner a group dislikes allows researchers to avoid any normative judgment. 290 Deviance can include many forms of conduct,
some of which most people would view negatively, such as criminal
conduct causing harm to others as well as violations of moral codes
against cheating, telling untruths, shirking, free-riding, and the
like. 291 Some deviance is morally neutral, such as “acting differently” in ways individuals cannot control.292 These are the characteristics to which antidiscrimination law tends to apply, because persons are being treated negatively for irrational reasons.293 A third
category involves deviance that is morally admirable, at least in the
eyes of some people.294 This category involves individuals who deviate from social norms in positive ways and has come to be termed

287

Søren Kristiansen, Studying Deviance, in DEVIANCE HANDBOOK, supra
note 286, at 13. “[D]eviance is not a quality of the act a person commits, but rather
a consequence of the application by others of rules and sanctions . . . .” BECKER,
supra note 286, at 9.
288
See generally Pat Lauderdale, The Definitions of Deviance, in DEVIANCE
HANDBOOK, supra note 286, at 3 (discussing examples of when people may or
may not be labled deviant depending on the observer’s point of view).
289
See BECKER, supra note 286, at 8–9.
290
See Nicole A. Shoenberger, Bridging Normative and Reactivist Perspective: An Introduction to Positive Deviance, in DEVIANCE HANDBOOK, supra note
286, at 24, 24.
291
See BECKER, supra note 286, at 8–9; Lauderdale, supra note 288, at 3.
292
See BECKER, supra note 286, at 9; ANDREW SOLOMON, FAR FROM THE
TREE 170–73, 407–09, 417–19 (2012).
293
See supra notes 41–44 and accompanying text (discussing characteristics
antidiscrimination law protects).
294
See Shoenberger, supra note 290, at 25.
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“positive deviance.” 295
The study of positive deviance is fairly new, but can offer much
to an inquiry into the social neuroscience of acting differently.
Those who study positive deviance investigate heroes and other persons of particularly high moral courage,296 iconoclasts,297 whistleblowers, and “moral entrepreneurs.”298 Research shows that contes295
For a general introduction, see Shoenberger, supra note 290, at 24. See also
SOLOMON, supra note 292, at 170–73, 407–09, 417–19 (investigating many examples of positive and stigmatized deviance, including geniuses, child musical
prodigies, and persons with cognitive disabilities, and the like).
296
Phillip Zimbardo, the instigator of the Stanford Prison Experiment, in more
recent years has turned to studying these resisters, whom he calls heroes for resisting the forces that cause conformity. See ZIMBARDO, supra note 239, at 488.
297
See BERNS, supra note 223, at 15–16 (presenting a social neuroscientist’s
perspective on the brain characteristics underlying iconoclastic thinking).
298
Lauderdale, supra note 288, at 6 (giving examples such as Ralph Nader,
Mother Theresa, Bobby Seale, Chelsea Manning, Edward Snowden, Daniel Ellsberg, and others, and noting that these figures “fuel the debate on whether they
are patriots or traitors”). For a case example discussing 1970s anti-war activist
David Dellinger’s biography, see id. at 7–8.
Others include “rate busters”—in other words, individuals who receive negative attention for doing better than the group standard and thus increasing performance pressure on the group. Shoenberger, supra note 290, at 27. This can
involve morally neutral performances, such as the straight-A high school student
whom other students dislike; or actions with a moral valence, such as whistleblowing or speaking out against unjust acts. See id.; Lauderdale, supra note 288,
at 6. And, of course, different audiences may have very different reactions: parents
may admire the straight-A student while fellow students do not, just as members
of the public may admire the whistleblower even while her employer fires her for
exposing embarrassing secrets. See Lauderdale, supra note 288, at 6; Shoenberger, supra note 290, at 27. For example, members of U.S. society remain
deeply split about the morality of the actions of national security whistleblower
Edward Snowden. See Drew Desilver, Most Young Americans Say Snowden Has
Served the Public Interest, PEW RES. CTR. (Jan. 22, 2014), http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2014/01/22/most-young-americans-say-snowden-hasserved-the-public-interest/ (finding that fifty-seven percent (57%) of eighteen to
twenty-nine year olds think Snowden’s leaks served rather than harmed the public
interest, whereas only thirty-nine percent (39%) of fifty to sixty-four year olds
and thirty-five percent (35%) of people sixty-five years old or over agree). Indeed,
research shows that contestation around whether particular forms of deviance are
positive or negative can drive social and cultural change. One researcher, for example, studied the French Impressionists in historical context as a case study
demonstrating the potential “relativity” of positive versus negative deviance. See
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tation about how to judge particular forms of deviance often constitutes a driver for social and cultural change.299 Antidiscrimination
theorists and civil rights historians study this phenomenon too, as I
will discuss further in Section II.B.1 below.
Social neuroscientists have further found that groups are most
hostile to deviance when it is in-group members who violate group
norms.300 They refer to this phenomenon as the “black sheep” effect.301 These findings suggest, as I will discuss further in Section
II.A.4 below, that internal “deviants” or dissenters—i.e., those akin
to whistleblowers in organizations—require strong antiretaliation
laws to protect them in performing a socially important role. I move
on to this discussion by bringing together the social neuroscience
and legal theory literatures below.
II.

HOW SOCIAL NEUROSCIENCE CAN INFORM
ANTIDISCRIMINATION LAW
My aim in this Part is not so much to provide fully formed proposals for legal reform but to put two literatures—i.e., social neuroscience and legal antidiscrimination theory—into closer conversation with each other. As I already mentioned in the Introduction, I
Shoenberger, supra note 290, at 30 (citing Druann Maria Heckert, The Relativity
of Positive Deviance: The Case of the French Impressionists, 10 DEVIANT BEHAV.
131 (1989)).
299
Shoenberger, supra note 290, at 28–30.
300
Cf. Alastair Coull et al., Protecting the Ingroup: Motivated Allocation of
Cognitive Resources in the Presence of Threatening Ingroup Members, 4 GROUP
PROCESSES & INTERGROUP REL. 327, 329 (2001) (finding that the most loyal
members of groups are the most likely to lash out against those group members
whose ideas deviate from the status quo).
301
Id.; see also Jose M. Marques & Vincent Y. Yzerbyt, The Black Sheep
Effect: Judgmental Extremity Towards Ingroup Members in Inter- and Intragroup Situations, 18 EUR. J. SOC. PSYCHOL. 287, 289–91 (1988). This experiment,
involving students at a Belgian university, found that, in comparison to a control
group, in-group members—in this case, law students—evaluated poor in-group
member speeches far less favorably than they evaluated poor out-group member
speeches. Id. In other words, their judgments about in-group members were more
extreme than their judgments about out-group members. Id. at 289. Marques and
Yzerbyt suggest that the black sheep effect reflects a process by which group
members define good exemplars of their in-group and at the same time strongly
reject “bad” ones, because they damage the self-esteem that comes from identifying positively with one’s group. Id.
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see two basic paths for how social neuroscience can inform thinking
in the antidiscrimination arena. First, more modestly, social neuroscience can encourage courts and others to adopt an expanded view
of how discrimination against traditional outsiders occurs. Second,
from a more aspirational and long-term perspective, social neuroscience can illuminate the need under contemporary social conditions
for an expanded appreciation of the classic, liberal human right to
“act differently” within the bounds of others’ rights to do the same.
Any discussion of the examination of difference in contemporary legal theory must start with Dean Martha Minow’s germinal
work in Making All the Difference.302 There, Minow applies feminist theory insights into what she calls the “dilemma of difference”
to point out that human variation becomes difference only because
those with the power define it as such.303 These ideas have genealogical roots in the approaches to deviance Becker and Goffman pioneered in the 1960s and 1970s, as already discussed in Section
I.C.3 above. Yet Minow goes farther, using feminist insights as applied to law to point out that antidiscrimination law necessarily must
grapple with difference because most barriers to equality cannot be
handled simply by treating all people “the same.”304 People differ,
and which differences matter depends on which groups have the
power to decide this question.305 Thus, Minow shows, antidiscrimination law must figure out how to encompass difference so as to
avoid simply reapplying rules that perpetuate the advantages those
with power have built into social norms.306
Since Minow’s call for hard thinking about difference, many legal theorists have explored related matters. Here I can only highlight
a few, though a thorough review of the literature would reveal many
important treatments.307 Most fundamentally, a central trend in the
302

MARTHA MINOW, MAKING ALL THE DIFFERENCE: INCLUSION, EXCLUSION,
AND AMERICAN LAW (1990).
303

See id. at 20, 22.
Id. at 20 (“The problems of inequality can be exacerbated both by treating
members of minority groups the same as members of the majority and by treating
the two groups differently.”).
305
See id. at 20–23.
306
Id. (“[R]efusing to acknowledge these differences may make them continue to matter in a world constructed with some groups, but not others, in mind.”).
307
See, e.g., Madhavi Sunder, Cultural Dissent, 54 STAN. L. REV. 495, 500–
304
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literature has been to urge greater tolerance for difference as a feature of antidiscrimination law, just as social science research has
reached similar conclusions, as I have sketched throughout Part I
above. How then, practically speaking, could this be done in antidiscrimination law? Below I highlight several ways in which courtcrafted antidiscrimination doctrines could be “tweaked” in this direction of tolerating difference more broadly. As I go, I will highlight some of the specific points of consilience between the findings
of social neuroscience and the insights of antidiscrimination theory.
A. Courts Should Expand Their Appreciation for the Complex
Ways in Which Discrimination Occurs
1. COURTS SHOULD EXAMINE DISCRIMINATION BASED ON
PERCEPTIONS OF BEHAVIORAL DIFFERENCE
Part I discussed the social neuroscience findings that “System
One” processes, in the terminology of Kahneman and Tversky, can
trigger negative reactions based on perceptions that someone is acting differently. This linking of discrimination to an actor’s vague,
negative perception that someone is acting differently has echoes in
the legal antidiscrimination concept of “performing identity,” most
thoroughly developed in the late-1990s work of Carbado and Gulati.308 The basic idea is that the social self “construct[s]” itself by
performing identity in front of others, as Goffman described in
1971.309 Others react to this performance, and it is this interaction
that creates identity.310 It can also lead to unlawful discrimination,
02 (2001) (arguing that law must better respect internal dissent within groups
about cultural norms).
308
See, e.g., Devon W. Carbado & Mitu Gulati, Working Identity, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 1259, 1292 (2000) [hereinafter Carbado & Gulati, Identity]; see also
Devon W. Carbado & Mitu Gulati, Conversations at Work, 79 OR. L. REV. 103,
127–35 (2000) [hereinafter Carbado & Gulati, Conversations] (discussing examples of performing identity in law firms and law faculties); Carle, Agency, supra
note 28 (pointing to leading civil rights legal historian Ken Mack’s use of social
theorists’ performance theory in his work); see also, e.g., CARBADO & GULATI,
supra note 50, at 80–95 (discussing “identiy performance” in the context of “gender performance” of women in the workplace).
309
See GOFFMAN, supra note 157, at 5.
310
See id.
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as Carbado and Gulati explore.311
Carbado and Gulati examine Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins,312 an
iconic U.S. Supreme Court case on gender discrimination.313 There,
the Price Waterhouse accounting firm was considering for partnership Ann Hopkins, a talented employee.314 Hopkins had the reputation for being a hard-charging project manager who was highly demanding of team members and unkind to subordinates, but she produced excellent results that pleased clients. 315 Nevertheless, the
firm’s partnership voted to postpone her partnership consideration. 316 Afterwards, one of the partners who supported Hopkins’
candidacy counselled her to “walk more femininely, talk more femininely, dress more femininely, wear make-up, have her hair styled,
and wear jewelry.”317
Hopkins filed suit arguing that these admissions about the decision-makers’ motives were direct evidence of illegal gender stereotyping.318 The U.S. Supreme Court agreed.319 Price Waterhouse had
considered other women candidates for partnership before considering Hopkins, and the firm argued that this showed that it did not
discriminate on the basis of sex.320 Rejecting this defense, the Court
held that discrimination could occur based not only on identity per
se, but also based on stereotypes about how one should behave—or
perform one’s identity, to use Carbado and Gulati’s phrase—as a
female.321 A Price Waterhouse partner had squarely admitted that
the firm rejected Hopkin’s bid for partnership because of genderlinked characteristics pertaining to how she acted: She did not
properly engage in the stereotypic performances associated with being a “lady” partner, as he quaintly put it.322
311
312
313
314
315
316
317
318
319
320
321
322

Carbado & Gulati, Identity, supra note 308, at 1262.
490 U.S. 228 (1989).
CARBADO & GULATI, supra note 50, at 84–90.
Hopkins, 490 U.S. at 233–34.
Id. at 234.
Id. at 235.
Id. at 235; CARBADO & GULATI, supra note 50, at 84.
Hopkins, 490 U.S. at 232.
Id. at 256–58.
Id. at 236.
Id. at 251; CARBADO & GULATI, supra note 50, at 81.
Hopkins, 490 U.S. at 235.
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Carbado and Gulati, as well as others, point out that the insights
the Court stumbled upon in Price Waterhouse have many more applications. 323 Most obviously, discrimination can occur whenever
employers hold stereotypes about how persons belonging to traditional outsider categories should behave.324
Carbado and Gulati identify many ways this can occur. Most of
their examples focus on large law firms and the law school professorate, two contexts they know well.325 One scenario involves what
Carbado and Gulati refer to as “lumpy” good citizen assignments in
both law schools and law firms.326 These are time-consuming institutional service assignments, such as being on hiring or diversity
committees, which take a great deal of time away from the kinds of
work, such as writing well-placed law review articles or handling
big deals, that end up being most important to the evaluation of junior employees at promotion time.327
Thus, as Carbado and Gulati’s work teaches, discrimination on
the basis of traditional outsider status can occur based not only on a
worker’s status per se, but also based on perceptions of what is appropriate conduct for a person of a particular identity.328 Ann Hopkins was subject to illegal discrimination not because she was female, but because she did not perform that identity in a particular,
stereotypical manner—she did not, in the words of the Price Waterhouse partner, act “femininely.”329 Yet she faced a classic Catch-22,
because the firm at the same time expected her to be hard charging
in impressing clients and pushing her work forward in the firm.330
The social science concept of deviance maps onto Carbado and
Gulati’s ideas of performativity. As Carbado and Gulati point out,
323
CARBADO & GULATI, supra note 50, at 84–94. For other work in this vein,
see, for example, Camille Gear Rich, Performing Racial and Ethnic Identity: Discrimination by Proxy and the Future of Title VII, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1134 (2004);
Laura Morgan Roberts & Darryl D. Roberts, Testing the Limits of Antidiscrimination Law: The Business, Legal, and Ethical Ramifications of Cultural Profiling
at Work, 14 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL’Y 369 (2007).
324
Roberts & Roberts, supra note 323, at 370.
325
Carbado & Gulati, Conversations, supra note 308, at 129–30.
326
Id. at 127.
327
Id.
328
Carbado & Gulati, Identity, supra note 308, at 1294.
329
Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 235.
330
Id. at 234; CARBADO & GULATI, supra note 50, at 90–91.
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persons with traditional outsider identities frequently face Catch-22
situations. 331 Social norms call on traditional outsiders to signal that
they realize they are inferior, yet social expectations also call on
them to present themselves as competent agents in performing their
positions. 332 This point is central to civil rights historian Ken
Mack’s important book Representing the Race: The Creation of the
Civil Rights Lawyer, 333 as I have explored in greater depth elsewhere.334 Mack shows that mid-twentieth century African American
civil rights lawyers produced social change through the very act of
performing their identity as courtroom lawyers.335 In that capacity,
they necessarily had to act as the equals of the white lawyers and
witnesses with which they were interacting.336 Put otherwise, Mack
offers an example of social change produced through positive deviance, a concept I discussed in Section I.C.3.337 Performing identity
in the conflicted social spaces in which subordination occurs gives
rise to friction that can lead to positive social change, but it can also
lead to negative reactions from those in power.338 Those negative
reactions, interlaced with status discrimination against traditional
outsiders, constitute classic discrimination—i.e., negative treatment
based on traditional outsider identity.339
331
See Carbado & Gulati, Identity, supra note 308, at 1291. Sometimes persons cannot help but be perceived as deviant, especially when an immutable characteristic is involved. Sometimes they can “cover” their differences, but only at
great cost to their sense of well-being, as I discuss further in Section II.B.1 below.
And some people have a high tolerance for risking the opprobrium that comes
from violating group norms. Some in this category are motivated to violate norms
out of a sense of higher purpose. Cf. Carle, Agency, supra note 28, at 528 (discussing Ken Mack’s investigation into how African American lawyers violated
social norms simply by performance of identity in their regular lawyering).
332
Carbado & Gulati, Identity, supra note 308, at 1294.
333
KENNETH W. MACK, REPRESENTING THE RACE: THE CREATION OF THE
CIVIL RIGHTS LAWYER (2012).
334
See Carle, Agency, supra note 28 (analyzing Mack’s work).
335
See MACK, supra note 333, at 86–98.
336
See id.
337
See supra Section I.C.3.
338
Carbado & Gulati, Identity, supra note 308, at 1291–93.
339
Carbado and Gulati, as well as Mack, teach that the situation is often even
more complex. People can rebel. They can reject a group norm for ethical and/or
political reasons. See BERNS, supra note 223, at 10–11 (presenting a neuro-economist’s explanation of the brain functions involved out-of-the-box thinking).
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Carbado and Gulati urged courts to pay more attention to various
traditional outsider quandaries about performing identity. 340 Yet
thus far courts have largely failed to do so outside the sex-stereotyping context. Social neuroscience can help return attention to why
they should: The brain may unconsciously discriminate against persons based on perceptions of nonconformity in how those persons
act in relation to their outsider identities. The mandate by Congress
banning discrimination against traditional outsiders requires that the
law reach such discrimination.
2. COURTS SHOULD TAKE THE HARMS OF WORKPLACE EXCLUSION
MORE SERIOUSLY
As discussed throughout Part I above, antipathy toward particular identity categories can result in social exclusion. Yet court-developed doctrines sometimes ignore the ways social exclusion results in unlawful discrimination. 341 Policymakers should revisit
those doctrines in light of current social neuroscience findings.
Here is one example: Antidiscrimination doctrine has long provided, correctly in my view, that an employee must experience a
“material” harm, such as a loss of pay, promotion, or one’s job, in
order to have an actionable employment discrimination claim.342 It
is the existence of such a material harm, also known as a “tangible”
action, that establishes that the employee has experienced discrimination in the “terms and conditions of employment,” as required under the statutory language of Title VII and similar laws.343
These types of acting differently also deserve legal protection, as I discuss further
in Section II.B.4 below.
340
Carbado & Gulati, Identity, supra note 308, at 1293–95.
341
See id. at 1293–95.
342
Timmons v. Gen. Motors Corp., 469 F.3d 1122, 1128 (7th Cir. 2006) (explaining that “an adverse employment action must be material . . .”); 1 ABIGAIL
COOLEY MODJESKA, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW § 1:2, at 1-4 (3d ed.
2017) (“A claimant can establish that the employer has taken an adverse employment action by showing that the employer has made disadvantageous changes in
the employee’s terms and conditions of employment that are objectively ‘significant,’ ‘tangible,’ or ‘material.’”).
343
MODJESKA, supra note 342, § 1:2, at 1-4 & nn.4 & 6 (citing relevant statutes and noting the significant difference in meaning of the term “adverse action”
under the antidiscrimination versus the antiretaliation provisions of Title VII); see
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3 (2012).
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Although the doctrine itself correctly states the statutory requirement, courts have sometimes applied the material harm test too restrictively. For example, courts have dismissed plaintiffs’ claims of
discrimination based on exclusion from informal work groups, trainings, social opportunities, and the like, and some courts have found
no material harm when employers assign workers less attractive
work within a job classification.344 These holdings tend to be highly
fact-specific345 and sometimes appear correct. After all, courts cannot grant relief for every minor incident employees experience at
work. Yet, sometimes courts’ conclusions on the question of what
constitutes actionable discrimination appear erroneous, as if they are
aimed more at clearing cases off dockets than carefully evaluating
whether discriminatory dynamics are in play.346 Where excluding
persons from informal opportunities and/or assigning them less desirable work gets in the way of their job success, material harm has
occurred.347
Better understanding of the relationship between in-group
bias, 348 social exclusion, 349 and discrimination could make courts
more attuned to how unlawful workplace discrimination takes
place. Trivial complaints should not make out an actionable claim,
lest courts end up even more flooded with antidiscrimination cases
(already an enormous problem but one outside the scope of this article to discuss).350 But long-term, repeated and persistent exclusion,
including social shunning linked to traditional outsider identity that
has adverse implications for job success, should be found actionable
by courts that examine these facts with more care than they sometimes take today.
Scholars have also documented other ways in which courts in
antidiscrimination cases give short shrift to more subtle evidence of
344

See, e.g., Higgins v. Gonzales, 481 F.3d 578, 585–87 (8th Cir. 2007) (holding that the plaintiff failed to establish an adverse action when her job duties were
changed and she was denied mentoring and training but did not lose pay).
345
See, e.g., id.
346
See Carle, Angry Employees, supra note 27, at 191–98.
347
But see Higgins, 481 F.3d at 586.
348
See supra Section I.A.2.
349
See supra Section I.C.
350
See Carle, Angry Employees, supra note 27, at 191–98 (discussing this
problem in more detail).
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exclusionary acts in the workplace. 351 Terry Smith, for example,
notes that persons of color, for whom discrimination is a constant,
raw, and usually un-redressed problem, see discrimination all
around them, while whites (which continue to represent the substantial majority of judges in both state and federal courts)352 are far less
likely to notice.353 A workplace encounter that would seem relatively minor absent the element of persistent discriminatory atmosphere feels far more intense to a person in a racial outsider category
who has had the experience of many similar experiences building up
over time.354
Courts should be more sensitive to these dynamics, as I have
argued elsewhere.355 In one iconic Supreme Court case in which the
majority ignored such facts in ruling against the plaintiff’s claims,
an employer insisted that an African American be the sole worker
assigned to clean up after the work of white employees in his same
job classification and denied this worker training opportunities
available to white employees who were otherwise similarly situated.356 In another, the Court rejected a class action lawsuit where
351

See, e.g., Keri Lynn Stone, Taking in Strays: A Critique of the Stray Comment Doctrine in Employment Discrimination Law, 77 MO. L. REV. 149 (2012)
(critiquing the “stray comments” doctrine, which permits courts to dismiss discriminatory workplace talk and insults as mere “stray comments” that did not figure into a decision maker’s actions).
352
See BARRY J. MCMILLION, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R43426, U.S. CIRCUIT AND DISTRICT COURT JUDGES: PROFILE OF SELECT CHARACTERISTICS 5, 17
(2017), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R43426.pdf (reporting that seventy-five percent (75%) of U.S. circuit court judges and seventy-one percent (71%) of district
court judges were white as of June 1, 2017); TRACEY E. GEORGE & ALBERT H.
YOON, THE GAVEL GAP: WHO SITS IN JUDGMENT ON STATE COURTS 18 (2016),
http://gavelgap.org/pdf/gavel-gap-report.pdf (reporting that eighty percent (80%)
of state court judges were white as of December 2014).
353
Terry Smith, Everyday Indignities: Race Retaliation, and the Promise of
Title VII, 34 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 529, 549–51 (2003).
354
See id. at 550.
355
Carle, Angry Employees, supra note 27, at 203.
356
See Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 105–08, 120–21
(2002) (holding that admittedly disturbing facts were time-barred for an antidiscrimation claim because the clock for the statute of limitations begins from the
time of each “discrete act,” not the totality of the discrimination). For a full explanation of the facts, see Morgan v. Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp., 232 F.3d 1008,
1011–13 (9th Cir. 2000).
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an employer granted work privileges, such as a separate air-conditioned dining hall and sleeping quarters, to employees in job classifications consisting almost entirely of whites, while relegating to
rougher, non-air-conditioned accommodations all employees in job
classifications consisting entirely of persons of color.357 The facts in
these cases reflect social exclusion of racial outsiders that affected
their terms and conditions of employment. The majority opinions in
these cases should have appreciated this. Judicial training on the
findings of social neuroscience could help increase courts’ awareness in this regard.
3. COURTS SHOULD REVISE THEIR EVIDENTIARY STANDARDS IN
HOSTILE ENVIRONMENT DISCRIMINATION CASES
In an analytically related but doctrinally different point, courts
should revise their evidentiary standards in hostile environment discrimination cases. Court-crafted doctrines hold that actions in a
workplace that create a hostile atmosphere are not sufficiently “severe or pervasive” to give rise to actionable discrimination if they
do not amount to a change in a “term, condition, or privilege of employment.”358 These doctrines are analytically correct, but can be
too restrictive when applied to hostile environment situations.
Employment discrimination scholars have documented many
ways in which courts in antidiscrimination cases give short shrift to
evidence of prejudice manifested through workplace verbal
abuse.359 For example, under the “stray comments” doctrine, courts
may dismiss egregious talk in the workplace involving use of the
“n” word and vile words about women as mere “stray remarks” that
357

See Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642, 655 (1989) (holding
that the plaintiffs did not make out a prima facie case of discrimination); id. at 663
n.4 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (noting the “plantation” atmosphere reflected in the
employer’s facilities).
358
Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 67 (1986); see Sandra F.
Sperino & Suja A. Thomas, Opinion, Boss Grab Your Breasts? That’s Not (Legally) Harassment, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 29, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/
2017/11/29/opinion/harassment-employees-laws-.html (pointing out that, under
the high bar the Supreme Court has set for sexual harassment claims, many situations laypersons would consider sexual harassment are not legally actionable).
359
See Carle, Angry Employees, supra note 27, at 192–95 & nn.28–30 (summarizing this literature).
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do not tend to prove discrimination.360 Courts’ frequent rulings that
such acts are not evidence of discrimination reinforce the message
that expressing bias is acceptable.361 In turn, that message coming
from the judiciary exacerbates hostility among social groups in the
workplace, worsening rather than ameliorating the problem antidiscrimination law aims to address.362
Neuroimaging studies of the brain show individuals experience
negative treatment from a group as severely painful, 363 as I discussed in Section I.C.2. This research can inform courts’ understanding of the harm of hostile environment discrimination. Those
findings indicate that working in an environment in which hostility
toward a social group is frequently expressed is, in itself, a change
in the terms and conditions of employment.364 Most certainly, working in an environment inflicting physical abuse would be sufficient
to meet the standard for discriminatory harassment.365 Courts should
be more aware that verbal abuse can create severe pain just as physical abuse does, and should evaluate facts in hostile environment
cases accordingly. While trivial comments should not be blown out
of proportion, courts should better recognize that both verbally and
physically abusive treatment can cause intense and long-lasting
harm amounting to a change in the terms and conditions of employment.

360

See id. at 199 n.57; Stone, supra note 351 (critiquing the “stray comments”
doctrine for allowing courts to grant summary judgment to employers despite
strong evidence of discriminatory motive).
361
See Carle, Angry Employees, supra note 27, at 198.
362
Id.
363
Giovanni Nolfe et al., Bullying at Workplace and Brain-Imaging Correlates, 7 J. CLINICAL MED., no. 8, 2018, at 1 (“Moreover, we observed a statistically
significant link between the hippocampal atrophy and the working environment’s
dysfunctional phenomena. This significant relationship is related to the work harassment and to anomalies of the interpersonal relationships (bullying at workplace) rather than to the phenomena more clearly related to organizational working stress.”).
364
See supra Section I.C.2.
365
See Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 23 (1993) (explaining that a
“physically threatening or humiliating” work environment is indicative of hostility).
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4. COURTS SHOULD EXPAND ANTIRETALIATION PROTECTIONS
All federal antidiscrimination statutes, as well as hundreds more
aimed at preventing environmental and financial harms, bar employers from retaliating against employees for complaining about discriminatory or otherwise unlawful employer conduct. 366 Happily,
from the perspective of antidiscrimination advocates, the requirements for showing an “adverse action” under antiretaliation law are
more lenient than the requirements for showing a tangible action or
material harm under the substantive antidiscrimination provisions of
various statutes.367 In the antiretaliation context, any employer action that objectively would deter a reasonable employee from complaining about unlawful conduct qualifies to establish an “adverse
action[].” 368 Less happily from plaintiffs’ perspective, however,
courts have imposed other onerous restrictions in retaliation cases,
especially as to the acceptable manner of employees’ conduct in opposing discrimination, as I have written about previously. 369 The
findings about the black sheep effect, as discussed in Section I.C.3
366

See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 12203(a) (2012) (prohibiting retaliation for reporting
discrimination under the Americans with Disabilities Act). For a helpful summary
of these many federal statutes, see JON O. SHIMABUKURO ET AL., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R43045, SURVEY OF FEDERAL WHISTLEBLOWER AND ANTI-RETALIATION LAWS 192 (2013), http://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R43045.pdf.
367
See MODJESKA, supra note 342, § 1:4, at 1-49 to 1-52 (explaining the difference between the definitions of adverse action under the antidiscrimination and
antiretaliation provisions of Title VII). To make matters even more complex,
some courts use the term adverse action in the context of both types of discrimination. Compare id. at 1-4 to 1-10, with id. at 1-49 to 1-52.
368
See Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 57, 66–67
(2006) (holding that the threshold for establishing an adverse action for purposes
of antiretaliation law is lower than under substantive antidiscrimination law; for
retaliation, an adverse action is any employer action that would tend to deter other
employees from coming forward with complaints about unlawful employer conduct); see also id. at 69 (“[T]o retaliate by excluding an employee from a weekly
training lunch that contributes significantly to the employee’s professional advancement might well deter a reasonable employee from complaining about discrimination.”).
369
See Carle, Angry Employees, supra note 27, at 215–17 (arguing that courts
should be more permissive in judging the manner in which employees may complain about discrimination without losing antiretaliation protection); see also id.
at 215–16 nn.140–41, 144–45 (citing additional scholars making similar arguments).
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above, document groups’ tendencies to be particularly harsh toward
internal or in-group dissenters (or so-called “deviants”) from social
norms. These findings are especially relevant in the antiretaliation
context, in which whistleblower employees typically are in-group
members of their organizations. Employees bound together by codes
of secrecy and loyalty find whistleblowers particularly repugnant.370
As social neuroscience findings regarding the black sheep effect
attest, retaliation against those who accuse an employer of committing moral wrongs is particularly likely, even by otherwise lawful
employers; groups, including organizations, strongly dislike criticism and are thus likely to lash out against internal dissenters. 371 Yet
as Justice White held in Burlington Northern, protecting internal
dissent of this type is highly important to the proper functioning of
the nation’s laws aimed at protecting the public interest.372
Justice White’s observations correspond to the social science research regarding the benefits of dissent and other forms of resisting
groupthink, as discussed previously in Section I.C.1 above. To encourage and protect employees who speak out against perceived employer wrongdoing, courts should err on the side of providing more
generous protections against retaliation. Again, a consilience
emerges between the empirical findings of social psychologists and
other science-based researchers, on the one hand, and antidiscrimination scholars and other civil rights policy advocates, on the other.
This consilience pushes toward greater protection for workplace dissenters as well as those who act differently in other scenarios. Indeed, the social psychology research I sketched in Part I counsels
greater protection of the right to act differently as a more general
principle as well.

370
See ROBERT C. VAUGHN, THE SUCCESSES AND FAILURES OF WHISTLEBLOWER LAWS 63–65 (2012) (describing a New York City police officer who was

threatened and harassed for breaking the “code of silence” because he refused to
take bribes or be complicit in corruption and, subsequently, gained a reputation
for “ratting out” his fellow officers). For an excellent introduction into the complex topic of the policy behind whistleblower law, see generally id. at 10–34.
371
See supra Section I.C.3.
372
Burlington N., 548 U.S. at 67 (“Interpreting the antiretaliation provision to
provide broad protection from retaliation helps ensure the cooperation upon which
accomplishment of the Act’s primary objective depends.”).
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B. Policy Influencers Should Press Forward on Recognizing a
General Human Right to Act Differently
The proposals I have offered above go to immediate pragmatic
tweaks to court-crafted employment antidiscrimination doctrine.
They would not require a fundamental overhaul of U.S. antidiscrimination law but instead change the interpretation of what constitutes
actionable harm. The last proposal I will discuss is far more abstract
and ambitious, but merits discussion nonetheless, especially because
it has emerged as an underlying theme in much recent civil rights
scholarship. That proposal calls on scholars, lawmakers, and others
to work toward the recognition of a general human right to act differently within the bounds of others’ rights. While ambitious, this
is not as outlandish a proposal as it might at first appear. Other
thoughtful scholars have made variants of it long before me, all the
way back to the classical liberalism of John Stuart Mill.373 In more
recent times, one such scholar is Kenji Yoshino, who introduced the
term “covering” to describe how discrimination based on behavioral
difference manifests itself today.374
1. RECOGNIZING THE HARM OF “COVERING” AND LIKE VIOLATIONS OF THE RIGHT TO ACT DIFFERENTLY
Ten years after Carbado and Gulati’s path-breaking work discussed in Section II.A.1 above, Yoshino picked up the theme of acting differently in a lyrical, genre-bending book that not only discusses but also models that theme.375 Part memoir, part prose poem,
and part legal analysis, Covering extends Erving Goffman’s insights
in Stigma to civil rights policy and law.376 Yoshino explores how
people struggle to hide nonconforming aspects of what he calls their
“authentic selves” in order to avoid social disapproval.377 Yoshino
asks why, more than five decades after the advent of federal civil
373

See MILL, supra note 58, at 76, 139 (opposing the “tyranny of the majority”
and arguing for the right of persons to liberty in conduct provided they do not
harm the rights of others).
374
KENJI YOSHINO, COVERING: THE HIDDEN ASSAULT ON OUR CIVIL RIGHTS
ix–xii (2007).
375
Id. at x–xii.
376
Id. at 18 (acknowledging his debt to Goffman’s work).
377
Id. at 184.
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rights protections, so many people still feel the need to “cover” in
this way.378 Yoshino’s theme, too, is about acting differently; covering, he notes, involves a demand to suppress “the behavioral aspects of identity.”379
In the personally reflective parts of the book, Yoshino focuses
on two aspects of his identity. One of these is as a gay man; another
is as a man of Japanese descent raised in the United States with an
ambivalent relationship to his heritage.380 In moving terms, Yoshino
describes examples of times in which he felt the need to “cover”
with respect to both these aspects of his identity. 381 Interweaving
personal narrative and the legal-analytic parts of his book, Yoshino
argues for a new civil rights paradigm382 that would essentially recognize a “right to personality.”383
Presciently, yet far too optimistically as it turns out, Yoshino
warns in 2007 that the country’s overwhelming focus on group identity politics threatens to “balkanize the country into separate fiefdoms of competing identity groups.”384 Almost wishfully, he predicts that Americans will move toward a new politics of universal
rights to liberty rather than encouraging the continuing fracturing of
people into divided identity groups.385 Yoshino acknowledges, however, that much of the work needed to bring such a concept to life
cannot be done by law.386
Unfortunately, Yoshino’s vision for universal rights to liberty
and tolerance of difference has not come to pass. Its dystopian opposite instead looms quite real in U.S. politics today as the nation’s

378

Id. at 24–25.
Id. at 24; see also id. at 22 (“Outsiders are included, but only if we behave
like insiders—that is, only if we cover.”).
380
See id. at xii.
381
See, e.g., id. at 59–63, 117–22 (relating personal narratives about his dual
gay and Japanese-descended identities).
382
Id. at 183.
383
Id. at 189 (invoking the German constitutional “right to personality”).
384
Id. at 183.
385
Id. at xii, 26–27, 183.
386
Id. at 192 (proposing that “law will be a relatively trivial part of the new
civil rights[,]” and noting that “many covering demands are made by actors the
law does not—and in my view should not—hold accountable . . .”); see also id.
at 27 (arguing for “social” rather than legal solutions).
379
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divisions along lines of social difference become ever more contentious. 387 But this state of affairs only makes Yoshino and others’
calls for universal civil rights—including a right to act differently
along the lines of the classic principles of philosophical liberalism388—even more important. His insights contribute to the arsenal
of arguments supporting the promotion of human variation as a positive feature of social life.389 In a politically dangerous time in which
a number of global leaders are manipulating the strong emotions induced by “us-versus-them” thinking,390 promoting the principle of
tolerance toward difference becomes all the more important.
Yoshino’s radical vision for the future has won dedicated followers. A recent contribution that builds from Yoshino is Zachery
Kramer’s book, appropriately titled Outsiders. 391 Using engaging
examples, Kramer in essence argues for a discrimination-based right
to expression of one’s personality.392 Kramer may not succeed in his
argument for a right recognized in law, but this work should make
other scholars take notice.
Still other scholars, such as civil rights legal historians Risa
Goluboff and Ken Mack, focus on the theme of acting differently as
well. I have discussed Mack in Section II.A.1 above. For her part,
Goluboff explores, in her multiple award-winning book Vagrant
Nation, a decades-long campaign in the United States to strike down
vagrancy laws as applied to a wide variety of so-called deviants.393
387

Cameron Brick & Sander van der Linden, How Identity, Not Issues, Explains the Partisan Divide, SCI. AM. (June 19, 2018), https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/how-identity-not-issues-explains-the-partisan-divide/.
388
See YOSHINO, supra note 374, at 25.
389
See, e.g., SUROWIECKI, supra note 252, at 29–31, 36–39.
390
See, e.g., Max Fisher, The Weaknesses in Liberal Democracy That May Be
Pulling It Apart, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 1, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018
/11/01/world/americas/democracy-brazil-populism.html.
391
ZACHERY KRAMER, OUTSIDERS: WHY DIFFERENCE IS THE FUTURE OF
CIVIL RIGHTS 4–5 (2019).
392
See id.
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RISA GOLUBOFF, VAGRANT NATION: POLICE POWER, CONSTITUTIONAL
CHANGE, AND THE MAKING OF THE 1960S (2016); Eric Williamson, Dean Risa
Goluboff Wins American Society for Legal History Book Award for ‘Vagrant Nation’, U. VA. SCH. L. (Oct. 28, 2017), https://www.law.virginia.edu/news/
201710/dean-risa-goluboff-wins-american-society-legal-history-book-award-vagrant-nation.
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These people included poor and homeless persons, persons on skid
row 394 —and especially African Americans, even when employed395—as well as those encompassed under the traditional image of the hobo, or non-geographically attached, freedom-loving
male wanderer whom Justice Douglas romanticized as a symbol of
liberty.396 They also included a wide range of others who did not
conform to social norms and were targeted for persecution under
anti-vagrancy laws for this reason.397 Thus, as Goluboff puts it, “the
‘queer,’ the ‘Commie,’ the ‘uppity’ black man, the ‘scruffy’ young
white one,” all embodied difference; the police and others who enforced law were “trained to see difference as dangerous, to see the
unusual as criminal.”398
Goluboff thus focuses on the commonality, in the form of shared
criminal persecution, underlying various forms of deviance. Vagrancy law bound a wide variety of groups embodying disparate
kinds of social difference. 399 As one key civil rights lawyer explained, vagrancy laws were used to suppress dissent; war protestors, communists, irascible political contrarians and other political
dissidents were prosecuted under their authority.400 Those laws likewise attacked race dissenters: “[If you are f]or integration[,] [y]ou’re
a Vagrant.” 401 Police applied vagrancy laws to dignified African
American ministers taking part in civil rights protests.402 They applied them to arrest mixed race groups in the South403 and to persons
in the wrong racial neighborhoods all over the country.404
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GOLUBOFF, supra note 393, at 80–81.
Id. at 115–20.
396
Id. at 228–29.
397
Id. at 3. Goluboff traces the origins of anti-vagrancy laws to SixteenthCentury English concepts of everyone having a proper place; those lacking social
power who threatened to move out of their proper place faced prosecution for no
other reason than this, whether they were “‘out of place’ socially, culturally, politically, racially, sexually, economically, or spatially.” Id.
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See id. at 25–26.
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Id. at 123 (quoting Anthony Amsterdam).
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Id. at 123.
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Likewise, sexual minorities came under their reach, as in prosecutions of so-called “vag lewd” charges against gay men and arrests
of persons of both sexes for cross dressing or even engaging in identity performances that fell too close to the line dividing the sexes.405
Vagrancy laws were applied to women having sex outside marriage
and women and African American men having sex across race
lines.406 Another application involved defining as vagrants hippies,
beatniks, and other members of the American counterculture of the
1950s and 1960s, whom police defined as criminally dangerous and
“vagged” merely because they violated conventional norms concerning styles of dress, hair, lifestyle and behavior.407
Goluboff does not focus on the application of vagrancy and similar laws to persons with disabilities, but another book fills in that
important gap. In The Ugly Laws, Susan Schweik documents how
civic leaders used vagrancy and other laws to banish from public
spaces persons with disabilities others viewed as unsightly.408 As in
Goluboff’s narrative, Schweik shows how persons with power used
laws to exclude and penalize persons regarded as repugnant due to
their perceived social differences.409
Both books trace various strains of the complex, decades-long,
intersectional, coalition-necessitating, and eventually successful activism that abolished broad vagrancy statutes as well as ugly laws.410
405

Id. at 3, 40, 47, 80–81.
Id. at 306–08.
407
Id. at 53–55, 170, 221.
408
SUSAN M. SCHWEIK, THE UGLY LAWS: DISABILITY IN PUBLIC 63 (2009).
409
Id. at 24–39, 63–64; GOLUBOFF, supra note 393, at 3.
410
GOLUBOFF, supra note 393, at 3; SCHWEIK, supra note 408, at 207–29.
Civil rights advocates argued that these laws violated values involving geographical and spatial freedom, privacy, equality and nondiscrimination, as well as rights
to nonconformity, all of which are complexly embodied in liberal interpretations
of the U.S. Constitution. See GOLUBOFF, supra note 393, at 298–332. Goluboff
also tells the story of how the Court has backtracked from these values, illustrating
that there is no certain path toward greater enlightenment on human rights issues.
See id. at 341–44.
As Goluboff further notes, the general theme of expanding tolerance for those
who act differently had emerged in legal scholarship by the 1970s. See id. at 399
n.9, 441 n.53 (citing NICHOLAS N. KITTRIE, THE RIGHT TO BE DIFFERENT 4 (1971)
(opposing forced therapy for so-called deviants)); see also GOLUBOFF, supra note
393, at 316 (discussing this theme in other legal scholars’ work, including that of
Charles Reich).
406
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These initiatives contributed to the U.S. history underlying contemporary moves to broaden recognition of a general right to act differently.411
There is, of course, a long stretch from constitutional law prohibitions applying to government action, on the one hand, and recognition of a general human right to act differently in all spheres, on
the other.412 But the historical narratives Goluboff and Schweik document are telling even though the Supreme Court’s retrenchment after “the long 1960s,” as Goluboff puts it, wiped out some of the gains
made.413 A general thrust toward the principle of greater tolerance
toward all—or, to put it another way, toward constructing a more
expansive and inclusive circle of regard414—remains an important
aspirational norm among progressive political forces.415
It may be that fostering cultural change in this direction, rather
than imposing legal mandates, constitutes the best strategy. This
may be for no other reason than the paradox that mandating tolerance is itself intolerant.416 This paradox bedevils anti-hate speech
campaigns.417 It can be seen in the tendency toward over-dogmatization that can arise from too much political correctness. 418 As

411

See SCHWEIK, supra note 408, at 207–08.
See GOLUBOFF, supra note 393, at 318.
413
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415
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And How to Avoid Them, GUARDIAN (Nov. 8, 2017, 7:37 AM), https://www.the
guardian.com/inequality/2017/nov/08/us-vs-them-the-sinister-techniques-of-othering-and-how-to-avoid-them (criticizing conservatives for “othering” minority
groups for political gains while calling for the creation of a “society where ‘we
the people’ includes all the people”).
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Cf. Victor C. Romero, Restricting Hate Speech Against “Private Figures”:
Lessons in Power-Based Censorship from Defamation Law, 33 COLUM. HUM.
RTS L. REV. 1, 12–17 (2001).
417
See id.
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E.g., Julia Symons, Essay, Has Political Correctness Gone Too Far?,
ECONOMIST (Sept. 10, 2018), https://www.economist.com/open-future/2018/
09/10/has-political-correctness-gone-too-far (acknowleding that “some aspects of
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Yoshino (and many other) legal scholars have noted, not all antidiscrimination and fairness goals can be achieved directly through
law.419 Some matters are best addressed, or can only be addressed,
through “best practices” policies promoted through voluntary action
in either the private sphere or the gray area in which public law and
private action intersect.420
Regulating through voluntary norms, or what is sometimes
called “soft law,” involves developing principles or standards that
civil society groups can use to encourage social change; in other
words, non-government actors can promote adherence to certain
norms.421 These standards lack the enforcement authority that accompanies “hard” law but can be effective through positive example
and also through negative informal sanctions such as shaming 422
(which, indeed, social neuroscience shows to be an effective technique for producing conformity, as described in Section I.C.2
above).
Below I briefly sketch some soft law or voluntary policies that
institutions can adopt to promote fairness thinking and “nudge”423
the law toward an expanded recognition of a right to act differently.
2. ADOPTING PRIVATE POLICIES AGAINST EXPRESSING PREJUDICE
A deep appreciation of the mechanisms underlying implicit bias
can help inform soft law approaches to upholding norms that favor
antidiscrimination and broader tolerance for difference. Social
419

See, e.g., YOSHINO, supra note 374, at 192.
Leslie C. Levin et al., The Impact of International Lawyer Organizations
on Lawyer Regulation, 42 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 407, 473 (2018) (discussing how
policies that reside at the intersection between public law and private action can
affect lawyer conduct).
421
See id. at 472–76 (giving an overview of the literature and discussion of
the relative advantages of soft law approaches); see also Kenneth W. Abbott &
Duncan Snidal, Hard and Soft Law in International Governance, 54 INT’L. ORG.
421, 434–50 (2000) (arguing that international actors often choose soft laws to
achieve effective solutions); Benny Spanier et al., In Course of Change? Soft Law,
Elder Rights, and the European Court of Human Rights, 34 LAW & INEQ. 55, 58–
62, 86 (2016) (providing a general overview of the literature on soft law and arguing that soft law can help in the development of elder law and human rights
jurisprudence as a step toward creating hard law in this field).
422
Levin et al., supra note 420, at 475.
423
See THALER & SUNSTEIN, supra note 123.
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norms that disapprove of prejudice and stereotypic thinking can help
reduce bias and increase fairness in decision-making. Similar results
might come from social signals encouraging the brain to think expansively about one’s circle of regard.424 As noted in Section I.B.1,
the worst situation for promoting antidiscrimination values is a social environment in which expressions of bias are deemed perfectly
acceptable. In such situations, the mental work of “cognitive control” to avoid bias does not even begin to occur.425 That work, the
reader may recall, involves the brain striving, with significant effort,
to prevent prejudice from entering into decisions about persons the
brain non-volitionally perceives as outsiders.
Social neuroscience findings highlight the damage caused by
flagrant expressions of prejudice, especially by high authority and
high visibility figures. 426 Race supremacists, neo-Nazis, and like
travelers who espouse ideologies of hate affect other people’s brains
in ways to which those brains are particularly sensitive, even when
they are not the ones directly subject to attack.427 Although, at this
juncture, free speech doctrines restrict the government from banning
much (though not all) hate speech, that does not mean that the policies of private institutions cannot do so.428 Below I explore some
ways in which instituitons can advance soft law in this respect.
3. PROMOTING DIVERSITY AND INCLUSION AS BENEFITS THAT
TRANSCEND THE CURRENT CULTURE WARS
There is currently a healthy political debate going on about the
benefits and drawbacks of “diversity.”429 There must always be debate about how to translate scientific findings into social policy, so
424

See SINGER, supra note 414, at 20–22.
See supra notes 180–83 and accompanying text.
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political theory on multiculturalism); see also Conklin, supra note 428, at 42–43;
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this debate is beneficial.430 What has become somewhat lost in it,
however, is the fact that the benefits of diversity are largely noncontroversial to researchers based in natural science paradigms. Indeed,
prominent natural science-based intellectuals, such as Nobel Laureate Edward O. Wilson, by no means a wild leftist, embrace diversity
as a biological idea. Wilson writes
[p]erhaps the time has come . . . to adopt a new ethic
of racial and hereditary variation . . . . It would give
proper measure to our species’ genetic variation as an
asset, prized for the adaptability it provides all of us
during an increasingly uncertain future. Humanity is
strengthened by a broad portfolio of genes that can
generate new talents, additional resistance to diseases, and perhaps even new ways of seeing reality.
For scientific as well as for moral reasons, we should
learn to promote human biological diversity for its
own sake instead of using it to justify prejudice and
conflict.431
This consilience between the biologically based sciences and legal theory provides another boost to arguments supporting the promotion of diversity writ large.
Groupthink research also provides empirical support for diversity. From various disciplinary perspectives, as I have explained
above, the research on groupthink shows that combining diverse, independent human perspectives produces more accurate judgments.432 This is one of the reasons social psychologists argue for

Symons, supra note 418.
430
See, e.g., Paul Cairney & Kathryn Oliver, If Scientists Want to Influence
Policymaking, They Need to Understand It, GUARDIAN (Apr. 27, 2016, 1:00 AM),
https://www.theguardian.com/science/political-science/2016/apr/27/if-scientistswant-to-influence-policymaking-they-need-to-understand-it.
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WILSON, SOCIAL CONQUEST, supra note 80, at 80–81; see also id. at 254
(“[S]ocieties are mistaken to disapprove of homosexuality . . . . [Gay persons]
should be valued instead for what they contribute constructively to human diversity. A society that condemns homosexuality harms itself.”).
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See SUROWIECKI, supra note 252, at 29–31; supra Section I.C.3.
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the benefits of diversity writ large.433 From a social science perspective, as from a natural science perspective, promoting diversity—
defined as many variations in the ideas generated by our so-called
cultural gene pool—appears highly beneficial.
These conclusions converge with the fundamental tenets of classical liberalism. These tenets include the need for a “marketplace of
ideas,” competition among ideas and the value of not shutting down
or barring political disagreement—which, it bears noting, are ideas
different from protecting hate speech.434 These concepts in political
liberalism map onto theories in both the natural and social sciences
that promote the value of diversity in human affairs. Evolutionary
psychologists understand these benefits in biological terms, drawn
from understanding the benefits of a broad gene pool;435 organizational psychologists understand them in terms of better group decision-making, as discussed in Section I.C.1 above. Again and again,
varying knowledge disciplines return to core principles anchored in
protecting human beings’ right to act differently.
The evidence on how the brain processes difference can be
brought into conversation with the research on social exclusion. Being subject to ostracization causes individuals to experience social
pain. 436 When people experience social pain (and all people do,
though to widely varying extents), they sometimes try even harder
to conform to group norms, exacerbating the negative phenomenon
of groupthink.437 That feedback loop hurts not only individuals but
also the performance of groups in which it occurs.438 Thus, promoting difference as a matter of policy requires institutions to conduct
433
See BERNS, supra note 223, at 104 (“[A] group with a lot of diversity
among its members is more likely to arrive at a good decision than a group that is
composed of members who are alike.”).
434
See Kathleen E. Mahoney, Hate Speech: Affirmation or Contradiction of
Freedom of Expression, 1996 U. ILL. L. REV. 789, 793–94. Note that social neuroscience helps establish how expressions that dehumanize others in fact diminish
rich and diverse political speech. Researchers have now documented the harmful
effects of dehumanizing speech on others’ brains. See supra Section I.C.2. These
scientific findings counsel in favor of considering revisions in free speech doctrines, though that complex subject is beyond the scope of this project.
435
See WILSON, SOCIAL CONQUEST, supra note 80, at 80–81.
436
See supra Section I.C.2.
437
See supra Section I.C.2.
438
See SUROWIECKI, supra note 252, at 29–31 (noting that research shows that
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self-audits for where barriers to the inclusion of difference exist.439
Are there policies that divide or segregate people in one’s institution? If so, are there important reasons for such policies or do they
exist merely as a matter of tradition? What do the people on the outside of the divide between the in-group and the out-group think
about their experience, and how would they propose moving toward
a more comfortable and accepting environment for all? These steps
are good policy even though they are not embodied in hard law.440
Moroever, one day some of these policy experiments may become
incorporated in law, just as has happened in antidiscrimination law
as well as other fields.441
4. DEVOTING MORE RESOURCES TO IMPLICIT BIAS INTERVENTIONS
While researchers are studying how to reduce implicit bias, they
have found no silver bullet. To the contrary, researchers have found
that short-term trainings aimed at countering implicit bias do not
work, though longer-term interventions that rely on multiple components to address implicit bias seem more effective. 442 The research indicates that professionals can be trained to not act on their

the best performing groups are not necessarily composed of the top experts or the
best individual performers; instead, the dynamic of diverse viewpoints coming
together accounts for the superior results groups can produce).
439
See Sarah Brown, Auditing Diversity (May 15, 2016), https://www.chronicle.com/article/Auditing-Diversity/236428.
440
See id.
441
See generally, e.g., ANTHONY S. CHEN, THE FIFTH FREEDOM 32–87 (2009)
(on the historical move from quasi-voluntary standards to hard law in employment
antidiscrimination law).
442
Mimi V. Chapman et al., Making a Difference in Medical Trainees’ Attitudes Toward Latino Patients: A Pilot Study of an Intervention to Modify Implicit
and Explicit Attitudes, 199 SOC. SCI. & MED. 202, 203–06 (2018) (describing a
promising “visual approach” intervention aimed at changing medical trainees’ attitudes toward Latino patients, which used life narratives and photos Latino adolescents made for doctors in response to the prompt, “What I wish my doctor knew
about my life”); Patricia G. Devine et al., Long-Term Reduction in Implicit Race
Bias: A Prejudice Habit-Breaking Intervention, 48 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 1267, 1268, 1276 (2012) (finding that a multi-faceted twelve-week program produced dramatic reductions in implicit race bias, especially among people
who were concerned about discrimination, while noting that it is unclear if shortterm programs work); Calvin K. Lai et al., Reducing Implicit Racial Preferences:
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implicit biases even though they continue to test as having them.
One study, for example, found that police officers could be trained
to not act upon their implicit biases in shooting situations, while civilians could not. 443 Another leading expert suggests that reminders—i.e., “priming”—can help doctors avoid implicit bias in pain
prescriptions if given right at the time they are writing the prescriptions.444
Such research on how to reduce implicit bias is still in its early
stages;445 much more helpful information promises to be discovered
soon about how to disrupt implicit bias in the workplace and elsewhere. Only time will tell what works, and policymakers interested
in these matters should continue to monitor research developments.
I. A Comparative Investigation of 17 Interventions, 143 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL.: GEN. 1765, 1780–82 (2016) (comparing seventeen studies of interventions
and finding that, when an intervention leverages multiple mechanisms to increase
their impact on implicit bias preferences, it seems to be the most effective).
443
See Joshua Correll et al., Across the Thin Blue Line: Police Officers and
Racial Bias in the Decision to Shoot, 92 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1006,
1020 (2007) (finding that both lay persons and police officers showed “robust
racial bias” in response times regarding decisions to shoot Black versus White
targets, but for police officers with training, this bias did not manifest itself in the
decision to shoot).
444
See Hidden Brain: Radio Replay: The Mind of the Village, NPR (Mar. 9,
2018), https://www.npr.org/templates/transcript/transcript.php?storyId=5918954
26. The following exchange occurred between implicit bias expert Mahzarin Banaji and the podcast host Shankar Vedantam:
BANAJI: You type in a painkiller that you want to prescribe
to a patient into your electronic system while the patient is
sitting next to you. And it seems, to me, quite simple that
when you type in the name of any pain killer - let's say codeine
- that a little graph pops up in front of you that says, please
note, in our hospital system, we have noticed that this is the
average amount of painkiller we give to white men. This is
the average amount we give to black men for the same reported level of pain.
....
VEDANTAM: In other words, giving doctors an opportunity
to stop for a second to make a decision consciously and deliberately. This can reduce the effect of implicit bias.
Id.
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A different, older empirical literature documents some of the
variables that can counter groupthink. Researchers have found, for
example, that groups are less likely to rely on groupthink if the
groups are cohesive because they are “commit[ted] to [the] task”
rather than if they are cohesive because of “interpersonal attraction.”446 Moreover, small diverse groups foster more individual participation and generate a broader array of ideas than do larger, more
homogeneous ones. 447 In other words, increasing diversity in
groups that allow for individual participation lowers the likelihood
of groupthink. 448 Some researchers have also found that diverse
groups often are more productive than homogenous ones. 449 In
short, promoting diversity in small work groups that relate interpersonally can help counter groupthink, a finding that corresponds with
the complementary strands of literature on discrimination and on
groupthink I explored in Section I.C.1.
CONCLUSION
This Article has argued that antidiscrimination law should not
focus solely on status or identity discrimination, but should also embrace the concept of discrimination based on negative social perceptions of those viewed as acting differently. To support this thesis, I
have explored the emerging consilience between the findings of social neuroscience and related fields, on the one hand, and legal antidiscrimination theory, on the other.
Social neuroscience has shown that unconscious, non-volitional
processes in the human brain detect subtle, socially relevant behavioral differences.450 The brain’s perception of these subtle cues can
activate neural processes involved in warning about potential dan-
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ger. These automatic processes in turn can lead people to shun, negatively judge, treat badly, and illegally discriminate against persons
they perceive to be acting differently—in other words, as “other”—
based on whatever differences a society defines as socially salient.
In modern social conditions, human beings often deal with persons who are different from themselves. Indeed, pluralism and labor
specialization are keys to creativity and efficiency in complex modern societies. Modern societies, which are politically based on pluralism and economically based on labor specialization, could not exist without a rich variety of differences among people.451 The nonvolitional brain processes that can react negatively to perceived differences are maladaptive in present social conditions.
It is by no means the case that human beings are incapable of
interacting across differences. Interacting positively across differences is a perfectly doable—indeed, often a highly enjoyable—activity. The problem is that today’s political conditions raise increasing dangers of automatic neural processes being triggered so as to
cause discriminatory harms. It thus has become increasingly imperative that antidiscrimination advocates, using evidence-based research, promote appreciation for individuals’ “acting differently”
(within the bounds of others’ rights) as a foundational value in antidiscrimination law.
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See Sherwin Rosen, Specialization and Human Capital, 1 J. LAB. ECON.
43, 43 (1983).

